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Abstract 
Swedish agriculture has declined for several decades, and for potato cultivation, the decrease 
has been particularly dramatic. At the same time, Sweden has adopted a national food strategy 
that aims to increase the production of foodstuff in Sweden. If this strategy is to be realized, 
the trend of declining production must be reversed. To understand how the potato industry 
can develop, there is a need for better knowledge of how potato farmers make decisions under 
risk in potato cultivation. This study aims to understand how potato growers’ revenue targets 
affect risk-taking in cultivation decisions, and how other factors affect farmers’ willingness to 
take risks in their farm businesses.  
Potato farmers are basically risk averse and the industry needs to find ways to shift the risk 
from the individual farmer to other actors in order to create a better functioning of potato 
market that generates higher yields and greater profits on the potato market. For instance, the 
average farmer is prepared to forgo a six percent increase in average revenue, if the increase 
will result in a greater increase in the fluctuation of annual revenue. Farmers’ decision making 
is affected by their revenue targets, with a higher revenue target contributing to farmers being 
less risk-averse in cultivation in in the pursuit of increase revenue. There are also tendencies 
for a revenue target to function as a reference point for farmers to relate to. At the same time, 
the potato growers who have a desire to control and minimize the risks surrounding 
cultivation in the short term are also more willing to take more risks in the cultivation to 
maximize results in the longer term.  
The study was conducted as a quantitative experiment with an experimental survey, where 
potato farmers answer questions about which of different revenue distributions they would 
prefer. The survey also included questions about respondents’ potato cultivation, and which 
actions the they see as important in creating a more stable result for their business. The 
analysis uses statistical correlation tools and knowledge from previous studies from a 
Prospect theory perspective. 
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Sammanfattning 
Det svenska lantbruket har minskat under flera år och för potatisodlingen har minskningen 
varit än mer dramatiskt. Därtill har Sverige antagit en livsmedelsstrategi som har som mål att 
öka produktionen av livsmedel i Sverige. För att uppfylla detta mål krävs det att trenden med 
minskad produktion av potatis bryts. För att förstå hur branschen skall kunna utvecklas krävs 
det en ökad förståelse för hur potatisodlare tar beslut och hanterar en tillvaro med osäker 
avkastning från potatisodlingen. Denna studie har främst fokuserat på hur potatisodlares 
inkomstmål påverkar risktagandet i odlingsbeslut, men även andra faktorer som påverkar 
odlarens vilja att ta risker i sitt lantbruksföretagande. Resultaten från studien visar att 
potatisodlare ogillar risk och är beredda att avstå viss avkastning för att minska risken i 
odlingen. Exempelvis skulle snittodlaren avstå en ökning på sex procent i medelavkastning 
från potatisodlingen, om den medförde en större ökning av fluktrationen i avkastningen.  
Det som påverkar odlarna i studiens riskvilja är dels deras inkomstmål. Där ett högre 
inkomstmål bidrar till att lantbrukaren är mer villig att öka risken i odlingen för att öka sina 
intäkter. Det finns även tendenser på att inkomstmålet fungerar som en referenspunkt som 
lantbrukarna förhåller sig till. Där lantbrukarna är beredda att utsätta sig för den risk som 
krävs för att uppnå målet. Studien kan dock inte avgöra om det är inkomstmålet eller något 
närliggande monetärt mål som att täcka upp för sina kostnader eller uppnå en viss vinst som 
är viktigast för lantbrukaren på grund av att dessa mål endast har mindre skillnader. En annan 
del som påverkar odlarnas beslutsfattande är hur de uppfattar att deras egna kontroller av 
maskiner och odlingen stabiliserar avkastningen. De odlare som anser att deras egna 
kontroller är viktiga är också mer villiga att ta mer risker i odlingen. Dessa odlare anser även 
försäkringar och att följa regler är viktiga delar för att åstadkomma ett mer stabilt resultat.  
Slutsatserna från studien är att de potatisodlare som har en vilja av att kontrollera och 
minimera riskerna runt odlingen också är mer villiga att ta mer risker i odlingen för att 
maximera resultatet på längre sikt. Dock är odlarna i grunden ovilliga att ta risker och 
marknaden behöver hitta sätt för att flytta risk från den enskilda odlaren till andra aktörer för 
att skapa en bättre fungerande potatismarknad som genererar högre avkastning och större 
vinster för marknaden i stort.   
Studien är genomförd som ett kvantitativt experiment med en experimentellenkät där 
potatisodlare har fått svara på frågor om vilken av olika avkastningsfördelningar de skulle 
föredra. I enkäten inkluderas även frågor om potatisodlingen samt vilka handlingar som 
odlaren ser som viktiga för att skapa ett stabilare resultat för företaget. Enkäten spreds i 
sociala medier samt via utskick med hjälp av företag och fick in 21 svar som kunde 
analyseras. Dessa analyserades med hjälp av statistiska korrelationsverktyg och med kunskap 
från tidigare studier och Prospekt teorin.
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1 Introduction 
 
People differ in the way they make decisions under uncertainty and risk. This study presents 
insight into how the individual's own revenue target affects their decision-making. This 
chapter presents a background including potato cultivation, agricultural risks, and decision 
making, followed by a problem description. After that, the problem statement, aim and scope 
is presented. The final section is a presentation of the structure of the rest of the report. 
 
 Background  
The potato cultivation is an important crop for Swedish agriculture and society since it creates 
a large value in primary production with 1822 million SEK in 2012, which is 6.9% of the total 
value from the Swedish primary production (Eriksson et al. 2016). This value was created on 
only 0.9% of the total cultivated land. In the society potatoes are also important food since it 
is one of the food stuffs with the lowest carbon footprint per kilo in our diet, with 0.1 
CO2e/Kg, compared to rice with a carbon footprint at 2 CO2e/Kg (Röös 2014). In 2017 the 
Swedish government adopted a national food strategy (Löfven & Bucht 2017). In this 
strategy, the main goal is to increase Sweden’s self-sufficiency and profitability in the food 
sector. Potatoes are one of the foods that have the largest ability to increase the self-
sufficiency of food in Sweden (Eriksson et al. 2016). Nevertheless, potato cultivation has 
decreased over several decades. One of the reasons for this decrease could be that it is a risky 
crop, with risk in several domains, for instance, high pathogen pressure. 
 
1.1.1 Risk in agriculture  
In agriculture risk and uncertainty always play a significant role. Farmers try to secure their 
yield by developing better control and production processes in their farming (Hardaker et al. 
2015). Nevertheless, it seems risk and uncertainty are inevitable in agriculture. The risks that 
the farmers face comes from several different sources and domains (Miller et al. 2004). These 
can be directly related to the farm business and some would exist even without a farm, but 
still affect the farm business. Studies have shown that individuals’ risk preferences can differ 
among various domains (Weber et al. 2002; Hansson, & Lagerkvist 2012).  
 
The risk that is not directly related to the farm business but still affects it is the risk that 
relates to the farmer such as social or health risks. Health risk can be the risk of a heart attack 
and that is a risk that exists even without the farm but have a great effect on the farm business 
(Miller et al. 2004). Social risk relates to the social life of the farmer since the workload on 
the farmer relates to the possibility to participate in social activities outside the farm. Both 
domains are not risks for the farm business itself, but because of the close relationship 
between the farmer and the farm they are dependent on each other. The risks that are more 
related to the farm business is production, price, technology, financial, and political risks 
(Miller et al. 2004; Hardaker et al. 2015). 
  
Production risk for crop growers is caused by unpredictable weather, disease, insect, and 
many other unpredictable factors (Miller et al. 2004; Hardaker et al. 2015). The weather is 
always unpredictable and will affect the yield of the crop by being too dry or too rainy 
conditions. Also, extreme weather with hail and flood can decrease the harvest. There is a 
possibility to build away some of these risks with irrigation and drainage or just insurance 
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against damage from extreme weather. Disease, insect, and other biological pests can destroy 
the crop. To protect against these risks farmers uses pest management system, which helps 
them to know when to use plant protection.  
 
Price uncertainty has always been a significant factor for farmers’ profitability, and it relates 
to both farm inputs and outputs (Miller et al. 2004; Hardaker et al. 2015). The price risk is 
associated with the production risk. In the case of lower grain production on the aggregated 
market, normally it increases the grain price and gives the farmer a natural hedge. However, 
this may not hold for the individual farmer that gets lower production as such production does 
not affect the world price. The price changes due to the production can also create uncertainty 
since it is harder to plan the production with a fluctuating price. To avoid the price uncertainty 
the farmer can hedge prices in a future market or sell on contract. However, these future-
markets do not exist for all crops.  
 
Technology risk arises from the constant development of new techniques, methods, and 
products for farming (Miller et al. 2004). Technology risk is often viewed as a part of 
production risk but can also be a risk itself. New products such as chemicals, machines, and 
new crop varieties are being developed all the time and their beneficial effect can be proved in 
experimental culture. However, it might not be good/beneficial on a given farm because of 
varying conditions or that the farmer might be lacking the knowledge to obtain the full 
potential of new technology. The fast development of new technologies also contribute to 
uncertainty because a new method might be adopted, but even better methods can come close 
after. Were the first method becomes obsolete and the value of the method and its product 
disappears. To handle technology risk the farmer needs a strategy on when to adopt new 
methods and analyze how large the benefit of the technology is for his farm.  
  
Financial risks come from how to finance the farm business (Hardaker et al. 2015). The 
farmer who uses borrowed funds needs to share a part of the profit to the capital owners and 
the debt capital is paid before the farmer can take out any salary. However, the farmer that 
uses borrowed capital opens a possibility to invest in new technologies, which increase 
profitability and can lower other risks.  
Institutional risks is another type of risks that can affect farmers’ income and it comes from 
the interaction with institutions (Miller et al. 2004). These risks arise from the risk of 
unfavorable policy changes like changes in trade agreement or subsidies schemes. In recent 
decades, governments around the world have changed the conditions for agriculture, towards 
a more liberal and market-oriented strategy after a long time with governments intervening to 
lower farmers' risks with quotas and guaranteed prices. (Babcock et al. 2003; Hardaker et al. 
2015). This creates uncertainty for the farmer who no longer can rely on a guaranteed price. 
The legal institutions also cause uncertainty for the farmer with new rules for food safety and 
environmental control, as the rules are not always predictable.  
All these types of risk affect the farm and they can be handled in several ways. The farmer 
can try to reduce risks by controlling and monitoring his crops or using crops with a stable 
demand (Miller et al. 2004). He can also use insurances or hedging to transfer the risk from 
the farmer to someone else for a cost to reduce his own risk. The farmer can also use a 
strategy to absorb risks and handle uncertain events without having a catastrophic result. In 
order to absorb risks, the farmer can reduce the debt to manage financial damage better or 
diversify the production on the farm to avoid a bad crop creating a big problem. Another 
strategy for the farmer is to create a business that is more flexible to uncertainties. This can be 
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managed by avoiding fixed costs from owning specialized equipment and having broader 
knowledge (Miller et al. 2004). 
1.1.2 Decision making under risk  
To be able to understand how people tackle risk the literature has been analyzing decision-
making. Most economic theory on individual decision-making comes with the assumption 
that people behave rationally (Edwards 1954). In line with this assumption, the decision-
maker has full knowledge when making a decision and clear and stable preferences. From that 
comes the assumption that the decision-maker maximizes utility and will make the same 
decision again if he is confronted with the same choices again and will maximize his utility.  
The decision-making process is built on the following steps (Edwards 1954). First, the 
decision-maker needs to have different available alternatives to be able to make a choice. 
Secondly, the alternatives need to include some kind of outcome or outcomes, which have a 
value for the decision-maker so it will be possible for him to rank the alternatives. Finally, the 
decision-maker needs to have information about the probability of the different outcomes 
from the alternatives. 
  
To evaluate utility from decisions is the most commonly used model the expected utility 
theory and it has served the purpose of being the normative as a model of rational choice in 
uncertain conditions (Rabin 2000; Babcock 2015; Tonsor 2018). Bernoulli (1954) proposed 
the expected utility theory in 1783. The main assumption the theory makes, is that decision-
makers will increase their benefit from each gain. However, the increase in utility will 
decrease with every gain, which means that the decision maker becomes risk-averse.  
 
However, Simon (1972) has listed three reasons why people are inconsistent with the 
normative model: limited access to information about options, uncertainty about the 
consequences and limited human computational abilities. This observation led him to the 
conclusion that an accurate model of decision-making should be based on the concept of 
bounded rationality (Simon 1955). 
 
Simon (1990) argued that bounded rationality derives from computational capacities and the 
environment, which should work together. Throughout the decision process, people use their 
computation capacities in a specific environment which leads to satisficing but not optimal, 
choices. 
 
Another utility model is the prospect theory that was developed by Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979; 1992). The purpose of prospect theory is to explain individuals' behavior under 
uncertainty, where the individuals’ behavior is inconsistent with the expected utility theory. 
The main difference is that prospect theory does not value outcomes and instead value 
changes. These changes are gains or losses from neutral reference points and are making the 
model reference dependent. The individual reference points are not permanent and can change 
with time and experience. The gains and losses are not valued the same and a loss hurt more 
than a gain satisfies, this makes the individuals’ loss averse.  
 
 Problem  
Farmers that produce potatoes operate in an unusually risky economic environment even 
compared to other farmers (Walker et al. 1999). Potatoes are more vulnerable to production 
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risk as diseases, for instance, potato blight. Also, production risks that may arise from the 
weather are large for the potato farmers and about one percent of the total cultivation area in 
Sweden is not harvested every year because of the weather (Jordburksverket 2018). The fact 
that the potato is a food that sells directly to the consumer makes the visible quality more 
important with the peel and size, which creates even more quality risks for the potato farmer.  
Potatoes are also an inelastic commodity, which is subject to unusually large price variations 
(Acs et al. 2009; Hueth & Ligon 1999). Figure 1 shows the price fluctuation in the table 
potato industry compared to wheat during this millennium and most of the price variation 
comes from unforeseeable shocks in supply. The potato farmers are also exposed to high 
technology risk due to a lot of specialized equipment, as an example is potatoes are harvest 
with a special Potato harvester, which has no value for the farm without the potato cultivation.  
 
Figure 1. Prices of wheat and potatoes in Sweden 2000- 2017 (Own processing from Eurostat 
2019) 
Both production and price risk has increased for the potato farmers during the last decades. 
This comes from a shift in the table potato sector, where the farmers take more of the total 
risk in the sector and the wholesalers and stores take a smaller part of the total risk 
(Zachariasse & Bunte 2003). In addition to risk-shift, there is no price hedging market or 
other insurance schemes for the potato price, which makes it hard for the potato farmer to 
reduce exposure risk. Tomek and Gray (1970) argues however that price hedging on a market 
as the potato market do not necessarily lead to lower revenue volatility due to non 
interseasonal prices. During the time when the risk for the potato farmers has increased, the 
number of table potato farmers has decreased in Sweden, since 2000, the number of potato 
farmers has more than halved and is 2,500 in 2018 (Törnquist 2015; Jordburksverket 2018). 
This decrease is larger than the general decrease in Swedish agriculture.  
Given the inevitable risky and uncertain agriculture, it is vital to understand farmers’ 
decision-making (Harrison 2011). The understanding can be used to predict economic 
behavior, market outcomes and policy assessment, as well as individual risk analyses of the 
individual farmer. A greater understanding of the individual farmer’s risk perception would 
give a possibility to increase the total value of the agricultural sector. Harrison (2011, p. 355) 
explain the problem:  
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We now have many rich models of behaviour, allowing structural 
understanding of decisions in many settings of interest for the design of 
agricultural, food and resource policy. But we also realise that there are some 
basic confounds to reliable inference about behaviour. These are not side 
technical issues. Risk attitudes can involve more than diminishing marginal 
utility, and we have no signiﬁcant problems identifying alternative paths to risk 
aversion through probability weighting. Loss aversion is much more fragile, 
until we can claim to know the appropriate reference points for agents. 
If we admit that there is loss aversion from a reference point, it becomes vital to have a 
method that can evaluate what reference point farmers use. Today there are many elicitation 
methods that rely on hypothetical or non-hypothetical lottery-choice tasks (Holt & Laury 
2002; Eckel & Grossman 2002) and domain-specific risk preference scales (Blais & Weber 
2006; Hansson, & Lagerkvist 2012) or a combination of them (Reynaud & Couture 2012). 
The lottery-choice methods focus mostly on risk preferences that involve diminishing 
marginal utility and do it with small stakes and no real possibility for loss (Köszegi & Rabin 
2006). In laboratory studies with no real (monetary) loss, it becomes easy to assume that the 
reference point is zero, which enables a clear view of the risk preferences for the individual 
subject. However, those tests will not show any loss aversion or determine the subjects' 
reference points (Köszegi & Rabin 2006).  
The small stakes in most laboratory experiments can also be a problem even if studies have 
tested how different stakes affect subjects. Most research with different stakes has done as 
Reynaud and Couture (2012) with two different stakes, which do not show how or when the 
risk preferences change, just that they are changed.  
Heath et al. (1999) described a reference point as a target, where the motivation to reach the 
target increases when the person approaches the target. The target thereby has a high marginal 
utility and the person is prepared to sacrifice more to reach the goal. In an agricultural 
context, it would be conceivable that the farmer's revenue target will affect how he makes 
decisions about cultivation. 
 Problem statement  
Without a good hedging system and large quality risk, it is hard for potato farmers to avoid 
risk and these risks can lead to lower production. To be able to give farmers value-adding 
help it is essential to know more about how farmers make decisions under risk (Harrison 
2011; Tonsor 2018). The reference point is vital to understand decisions because it is not only 
the risk preferences with diminishing marginal utility that determines the decision-making 
under risk (Kahneman & Tversky 1979; Rabin 2000; Harrison 2011). In particular, the 
reference point since it is the starting point for other vital elements in prospect theory, the loss 
aversion, and diminishing sensitivity. A possible reference point that the farmers use is the 
revenue target for the cultivation. 
 
 Aim and research scope 
The purpose of this study is to widen the understanding of Swedish potato farmers’ decision-
making under risk, by using the revenue target as a reference point in a risk preference test. 
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(1) What affects Swedish potato farmers’ risk preferences when they take decision under 
risk? 
(2) How do potato farmers’ revenue targets relate to their risk preferences in Sweden? 
 
This study focuses on the revenue target as the primary reference point. Revenue can be seen 
as just a monetary figure because it needs the costs to determine whether it is good or bad. 
With that, a profit target would be more appropriate to evaluate the utility from. However, the 
farmers' profits differ because they calculate their own labor costs in different ways, some 
farmers do not include any cost for their own work in production and instead use the profit as 
a salary. The same with capital cost due to machines, which is also not a visible cost. This 
would make a given profit an actual loss if labor and capital costs were included. The revenue 
target is chosen due to its ability to involve both the price risk and the production risk. It is 
also a number that the farmer can easily relate to because it is the number he sees on the 
settlements and it can be compared cross different years. This makes it easier to create goals 
for revenue. 
 
The focus is on the revenue target with both price and production risk, which is analyzed as a 
factor. This despite the risk preference for price and production risk may differ (Weber et al. 
2002; Hansson, & Lagerkvist 2012). By not dividing them, the study is limited because it 
cannot say why the farmers have a certain risk preference. However, it is more important to 
explain potato growers overall risk preferences with both price and production risk. The 
potato farmers surveyed are autumn/winter table potato growers in Sweden in order to get a 
more homogeneous sample. 
 Structure of the report 
This chapter discusses the background and importance of the study, it was followed by an 
overview of the research scope and delimitation of this study.  
 
Chapter 2 – Theoretical perspective – This chapter presents the foundation of the conceptual 
framework this study uses with prospect theory. It also describes different eliciting risk 
methods used in this study and finally the conceptual framework of this study is described. 
 
Chapter 3 – Methodology – This chapter presents the overall research design including the 
research methodology and sample selection. Followed by a discussion of the approach of the 
survey and analysis of this study use. This chapter also discuss the quality criteria and ethics 
of the study.  
 
Chapter 4 – Empirical data – This chapter presents the data this study has collected with 
descriptive statistics for the different parts of the survey presented in tables and text. 
 
Chapter 5 – Analysis – This chapter present the result of the different analysis methods this 
study use.  
  
Chapter 6– Discussion – In this chapter is the empirical data and result from the analysis 
discussed from the view of the literature.  
 
Chapter 7– Conclusions – This chapter presents the final conclusions that this study 
contributes to and the limitations of the study. Last comes some suggestions for future 
research.   
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2 Theoretical perspective  
 
This study considers prospect theory as an alternative to expected utility theory to understand 
decision making under risk. Prospect theory is chosen over the more common expected utility 
theory since it is reference dependent (Kahneman & Tversky 1979). The reference-
dependence is vital since this study examines a monetary target with the revenue target. The 
conceptual framework is an experiment with lotteries involving both gains and losses from a 
reference point to understand the farmers’ risk preferences. The conceptual framework is built 
of ideas from the prospect theory and eliciting methods that is presented in this chapter. 
 
 Utility theory  
A trade-off of the possible outcomes is a significant part of economic decision-making and 
risk and uncertainty is an important part of computing the outcomes. Peoples risk preferences 
describes how individuals handle risk in their decisions. Below is a presentation of the two 
most commonly utility theories in the field of decision-making, expected utility theory, and 
prospect theory.  
 
2.1.1 Expected utility theory  
Expected utility theory is the commonly used theory to describe decision-making under risk 
(Moschini et al. 2002). The theory explains how the rational man maximizes the expected 
utility in a situation that involves risk (Bernoulli 1954). The rational man gains utility from 
every increase in wealth and the expected utility theory explains the amount of utility from his 
risk preferences. The subject does also know his probabilities and outcomes for each option 
that he can choose between and his relative preference for each outcome. If there is a choice 
with two options and two possible outcomes, he calculates the probability-weighted average 
utility for each option. This makes it possible for him to make a rational decision about which 
option has the highest expected utility and it might not be the one with the highest expected 
return. In expected utility theory the humans are utility maximizers and not wealth 
maximizers (Moschini et al. 2002).  
 
There are three significant types of risk attitudes; risk-averse, risk neutral and risk-seeking 
(Figure 2). According to the literature is most individuals risk-averse (Hardaker et al. 2015). 
Risk preferences do however differ between individuals and depends on many different 
factors like experience, age or gender. The risk-averse subject has a concave utility curve, 
which apply that every extra gain contributes with less utility (Hardaker et al. 2015). As an 
example, is the SEK that takes you out from poverty worth more utility than the SEK that 
makes you rich (Moschini et al. 2002). The risk-neutral subject has a straight utility curve. 
The risk-seeking subject has a convex utility curve. The risk-averse subject is willing to give 
up some expected wealth to be able to reduce some risk. The risk-seeking subject is willing to 
give up some expected wealth to have a chance to get more wealth.  
  8 
 
Figure 2. Utility function and shape for different risk attitudes (Own processing) 
 
2.1.2 Prospect theory 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) first developed prospect theory in 1979, comprising the 
critique against expected utility theory and how it is explaining the decision making under 
risk. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) demonstrate that when people are confronted with risky 
prospect choices under laboratory settings, their preferences systematically violate the 
premises of expected utility theory. One of the article's main findings is that people 
underestimate outcomes that are merely probable in comparison to outcomes obtained with 
certainty, which was called the certainty effect. This effect contributes to risk-aversion 
regarding choices associated with sure gains and risk-seeking regarding choices involving 
sure losses.  
 
Prospect theory captures these experimental pieces of evidence on risk-taking, including the 
recorded contraventions of expected utility (Kahneman & Tversky 1979). The model 
presented has a value assigned to gains and losses rather than to final assets, and probabilities 
are replaced by decision weights. According to the theory, people derive utility from gains 
and losses, which are measured relative to some reference point, commonly corresponding to 
the current asset position. The proposed S-shaped value function is defined on deviations 
from the reference point, it is generally concave for gains and convex for losses and steeper 
for losses than for gains (Figure 3). 
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Figure 3. A hypothetical value function (Own processing from Kahneman and Tversky 1979) 
 
In 1992, Tversky and Kahneman published Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative 
Representation of Uncertainty. In this article, Kahneman and Tversky developed a new 
version of prospect theory entailing cumulative decision weights instead of separable. This 
model applies to uncertain and risky prospects with any number of outcomes, compared to the 
old one, which was only valid for gambles with a maximum of two nonzero outcomes. In 
addition, it grants for various weighting functions of gains and losses and the weighting 
function is addressed to cumulative probabilities, e.g. probability of acquiring at least $200, or 
of losing $100 or more. The curvature of the weighting function explains puzzles about 
overweighting unlikely outcomes (the tails of probability distributions), which contributes to 
the understanding of why people buy insurances and participate in lotteries. The curvature of 
the value function reinforces the risk-aversion for gains and risk-seeking for losses.   
 
Under prospect theory, an option is evaluated as:  
  
Where V(f) is the overall value of prospects, v(·) is the value function (increasing) and πi are 
the decision weights. The formula contains the four elements of prospect theory, namely 
reference dependence, loss aversion, diminishing sensitivity, and probability weighting.  
 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) state that loss aversion is a fundamental concept in decision 
making. According to the concept is a loss more painful than a similar gain and it creates a 
kink on the utility curve at the reference point, when leaving the loss domain and entering the 
gain domain. If the subject is more loss averse is the kink greater at the reference point. Loss 
aversion is also involved in several biases as endowment effect and status quo bias (Tversky 
& Kahneman 1991; Kahneman et al. 1991). These biases can be explained by the concept 
that, as something in an individual’s possession will automatically be more valued by the 
individual just because it is in his possession. The thing the subject possess will, become a 
reference point for the subject and cost more to lose than it gave when it came. Tversky & 
Kahneman (1991) studies describe the level of loss aversion as losses are twice as painful 
compared to the pressure from gains. Heath et al. (1999) state that other studies have derived 
loss aversion factors between two and four. 
 
  10 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) state another important concept in all utility theory and it is 
diminishing sensitivity. It implies that the marginal value for one extra gain over the reference 
point decrease in value for every gain. For instance, an increase in revenue from 40 to 45 
thousand SEK is less utility gaining than a change from 35 to 40 thousand if the reference 
point is 35 thousand. The same diminishing sensitivity is valid for losses and the difference 
between a loss on 100 and 200 is larger than a loss at 1100 and 1200 (Tversky & Kahneman 
1991). This is what gives the S-shaped utility curve its characteristic formation (Figure 3).  
 
2.1.3 Reference point 
The reference point divides the outcome in what is a success and a failure (gains and losses) 
and is the neutral point in prospect theory, where the value is derived from (Tversky & 
Kahneman 1991). Most research has focused on a status quo reference point, which can be 
zero profit or zero income for a producer (Heath, et al. 1999; Köszegi & Rabin 2006). A non-
status quo reference point could instead be a goal that the producer has. It can also be a past 
experience or just expected outcome. The different reference point is important since the 
assumption of diminishing sensitivity and loss aversion is reference dependent. Koop & 
Johnson (2012) and other researchers have studied decision-making using multiple reference 
points. Koop & Johnson (2012) used three reference points: the status quo, minimum 
requirement, and goal. Their setting focuses on the use of multiple reference points at the 
same time and how people act near them.   
 
To show how the utility change near the reference point this study has created three problems 
that show how the marginal utility changes along the utility curve.  
 
Problem 1. Think of two farmers Carl and Erik who cultivate potatoes. Carl wants to obtain a 
revenue from sales of 60 000 SEK/ha and Erik wants to obtain a revenue from sales at 50 000 
SEK/ha. Both have the same cost and knowledge about potato cultivation. They have a cost of 
40 000 SEK/ha. If than Carl and Erik get 55 000 SEK/ha. Who gets the most utility from the 
cultivation? 
 
Here both have created revenue that exceeded the cost of the cultivation. Carl has however 
not reached his goal of 60 000 SEK/ha. With an assumption of only a status quo reference 
point, it creates the same value for them both from the cultivation. However, earlier studies 
show that with a problem like this will Erik get more value since he did reach his target 
(Heath, et al. 1999). This can be explained by a loss aversion and that Carl feels that he lost 
5000 when he did not reach his goal. 
 
Problem 2. Same problem as problem 1 but the difference is that this time the income 
increases to 60 000 SEK/ ha. What is the difference in value from problem 1 and who gets the 
most extra value? 
 
Here both Carl and Erik reach their targets, both for zero profit and revenue targets. Carl gets 
extra value for reaching his reference point at the revenue target when going from the loss 
side to gain side of the utility curve. Erik moves away from the reference point, so he gets 
more value, but the marginal value goes down because of diminishing sensitivity. Carl, on the 
other hand, is in the part of the utility curve that has the highest marginal value from gains. 
Figure 4 shows the difference between Carl's and Erik’s extra value with prospect theory’s S-
shaped utility curve and a reference point at their personal revenue targets. When the marginal 
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value of an extra 5000 SEK is higher for Carl becomes willing to sacrifice more to get them. 
The sacrifice may be exposing him to more risk in his cultivation. 
 
 
Figure 4. A derivative of the S-shaped utility curve (Own processing) 
 
Problem 3. The same problem as problem 1 but the difference is that this time the income 
decreases to 50 000 SEK/ha. What is the difference in value from problem 1 and who have 
the greatest change in utility? 
 
Here Erik reaches his revenue target, but Carl is further away from the target now than in 
problem 1. Carl goes from missing his revenue target with 5 000 SEK to 10 000 SEK. If Carl 
uses the revenue target as a reference point the value change in problem 3 becomes smaller 
than in problem 2 due to diminishing sensitivity in losses (Tversky & Kahneman 1991). 
Instead, if Carl uses the status quo (zero profit) as a reference point the change in problem 2 
becomes smaller than in problem 3 due to diminishing sensitivity in gains. Erik still reaches 
his target and will not be exposed to any loss aversion, but diminishing sensitivity makes the 
marginal value change larger in problem 3 than in problem 2.  
 
The theoretical framework shows the use of a reference-dependent utility theory as prospect 
theory has on potato farmers’ decision making. The main differences with a non-status quo 
reference point is what happens near the reference point, with loss aversion and diminishing 
sensitivity (Tversky & Kahneman 1992). Figure 5 shows the differences in a utility curve 
between a non-status quo reference point (Series 1) and a status quo reference point (Series 
2), where the status quo reference point curve overestimate the utility just under the reference 
point (40) and underestimate the utility over the reference point (60). These over and 
underestimations can change what prospect is preferred in decision with risk.  
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Figure 5. Different utility curves (Own processing) 
 
 Eliciting risk preferences methods 
The fact that risk aversion is a well-established concept in both economics and behavioral 
science as well as having a precise mathematical definition makes it theoretically possible to 
reach high precision (Thomas 2016). However, the theoretical disagreements about the utility 
theory, have resulted in the emergence of several methods to measure risk aversion. Despite 
experimental research, there is currently no general method for modeling risk aversion 
(Charness et al. 2013). Charness et al. (2013) instead recommend that the researcher should 
use the methods that best fit into the research question and the subject pool the study use. 
Some selected methods for elicitation methods that are relevant to this study follows. 
 
2.2.1 Eckel and Grossman method (EG) 
Eckel and Grossman (EG) (2002; 2008) method is based on a lottery framing were the 
subjects choose one out of five gambles, with two outcomes and each with a 50% probability 
(Table 1). The first gamble has a sure payoff and the following had a higher expected payoff 
but also a higher standard deviation. A totally risk-averse subject in that situation would 
choose the first gamble and the moderate risk-averse subject would choose the gamble two to 
four. If the subject is risk-neutral or risk-seeking it will choose the last gamble five with the 
highest expected outcome (Eckel & Grossman 2002). 
 
Table 1. Eckel and Grossman method (2002). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 A limitation with Eckel and Grossman's method is the ability to see the difference between 
risk-seeking and risk-neutral behavior. A more reason study from Reynaud and Couture 
(2012) used EG’s method but increased the number of gambles to nine with three gambles 
that show on risk-seeking behavior. This to be able to compare the result with a Holt and 
Laury test. Reynaud and Couture (2012) did derive a higher constant relative risk aversion 
0
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Gamble 4 4 40 22 
Gamble 5 0 48 24 
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(CRRA) coefﬁcient at the EG test than the Holt and Laury test when testing it on French 
farmers. They did derive a CRRA coefficient that was equal to 0.62 and 1.02 for a low 
respectively high payoff. CRRA coefficient is the most popular function to show risk 
preferences, U(x) =(x^1−r)/(1−r), where r is the CRRA coefficient (Harrison et al. 2007; 
Menapace et al. 2015). 
 
Eckel and Grossman (2002) did a test with different stakes to evaluate loss aversion. The test 
was divided into two stakes and they did not find any loss aversion in their lab setting 
different from previous studies by Kahneman et al. (1991), Tversky & Kahneman (1992). 
Charness et al. (2013) describe EG’s method as a simple experiment were the subjects is 
normally is a paid.  
 
2.2.2 The multiple price list method 
There are several types of multiple price list methods and one of the most used is Holt and 
Laury’s (2002) lottery method (Charness, et al. 2013). When using this method, a subject will 
choose between paired gambles in a list with two columns, Option A and Option B (Table 2). 
In most settings the payoff is constant between the rows in the column, but the probability 
changes between the rows. The subject chooses a preferred option between each of the paired 
gambles. In the first row Option A has a higher expected payoff and in all the rows after the 
expected payoff is increasing faster at Option B. In the last row Option B is certain to be the 
highest payoff. The subjects risk preferences are derived from when they switch from Option 
A to B. The very risk-seeking subject will choose Option B already in the first row and the 
totally risk-averse subject will choose B first in the last row.  
 
 
Table 2. Multiple price list, from Holt and Laury (2002). 
Option A Option B Option A Option B 
1/10 of $2, 9/10 of $1.60 1/10 of $3.85, 9/10 of $0.10 □ □ 
2/10 of $2, 8/10 of $1.60 2/10 of $3.85, 8/10 of $0.10 □ □ 
3/10 of $2, 7/10 of $1.60 3/10 of $3.85, 7/10 of $0.10 □ □ 
4/10 of $2, 6/10 of $1.60 4/10 of $3.85, 6/10 of $0.10 □ □ 
5/10 of $2, 5/10 of $1.60 5/10 of $3.85, 5/10 of $0.10 □ □ 
6/10 of $2, 4/10 of $1.60 6/10 of $3.85, 4/10 of $0.10 □ □ 
7/10 of $2, 3/10 of $1.60 7/10 of $3.85, 3/10 of $0.10 □ □ 
8/10 of $2, 2/10 of $1.60 8/10 of $3.85, 2/10 of $0.10 □ □ 
9/10 of $2, 1/10 of $1.60 9/10 of $3.85, 1/10 of $0.10 □ □ 
10/10 of $2, 0/10 of $1.60 10/10 of $3.85, 0/10 of $0.10 □ □ 
 
Tanaka et al. (2010) used another setting of the multiple price list method to evaluate risk 
preferences in Vietnamese villages. They focused on evaluating their behavior with the ideas 
from prospect theory. Their multiple price list involved three choice series to be able to 
examine probability weighting, loss aversion, and diminishing sensitivity. However, they did 
not examine reference point’s dependence.   
 
These types of tests can sometimes be hard to understand for the participants in a study 
(Reynaud & Couture 2012). Most of the multiple price list settings cannot differentiate 
between changes from diminishing sensitivity and probability weighting (Harrison 2011). 
Charness et al. (2013) describe these methods as complex and do mostly use paid subjects.  
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2.2.3 Questionnaires  
Questionnaires are a common method for eliciting risk preferences and are often based on the 
subjects’ self-reported beliefs about their risk preferences (Charness et al. 2013). The 
subjects’ answer by rating different statements about their risk behavior on a graded scale. 
The questionnaires cannot estimate any coefficient for risk preferences. However, they can 
estimate how risk preferences differ between domains (Weber et al. 2002). According to 
Weber et al. (2002) do risk preferences differ between domains and it is important to 
understand to evaluate individuals’ decisions. One often-used questionnaire is DOSPERT and 
it has 30 questions that show the risk preferences in different domains (Blais & Weber 2006).  
 
Hansson and Lagerkvist (2012) did a study about domain-specific risk preference among 
farmers. In the study, Hansson and Lagerkvist (2012) created a risk preference questionnaire 
for farmers. Their design uses a two-sided measurement, one with expected benefits from 
risk-reducing actions and perceived risk. The subjects answering 25 statements about 
financial, production, environmental and social risk management tools on a Likert scale 
(Table 6, 7), from the benefit side as risk-reducing and the same statements from a perceived 
risk side. They used factor analysis to analyze the questionnaire and find three factors of risk 
preference domains. The first was be up-to-date and in deliberate control of the cultivation, 
the second was carefulness and planning in the business in general, the last factor was 
progressive farming. This questionnaire for farmers has been tested on Swedish farmers and 
the result was valid against the farmers’ variation in profit, were the farmers that answered 
higher (more important) on the Likert scale had less variation in the profit for two of the three 
factors. The factor that was correlated with higher variation was progressive farming. 
 
 
 Conceptual framework  
The utility theories describe how the utility is derived from a utility curve. This study 
considers prospect theory as an alternative theoretical framework to expected utility theory 
and conduct an experiment with lotteries involving both gains and losses. The prospect theory 
involves more dimension than the expected utility theory, so an eliciting method that 
evaluates risk preferences needs to be able to control for these variables (Harrison 2011). The 
model also needs to evaluate if the risk preferences are depending on loss aversion, reference 
dependence, diminishing sensitivity or probability weighting.  
 
This study uses a type of EG method to be able to answer the research question, which is not 
commonly used with prospect theory. However, this study has another focus than most other 
research with prospect theory, when using a non-status quo reference point. EG method has 
good abilities to evaluate diminishing sensitivity for individuals using CRRA. The CRRA 
coefficient should be constant over different stakes, however, earlier studies including 
Reynaud and Couture (2012) shows that the CRRA coefficient increase when the stakes 
increase. When the CRRA coefficient changes it is like a kink in the utility curve, which can 
come from a passing a reference point (Tversky & Kahneman 1991). When using several EG 
tests it becomes possible to analyze how and why the CRRA coefficient change over different 
stakes, like in problem 1-3 earlier in this chapter (Chapter 2.1.3).  
 
To be able to evaluate the effect of a reference point the subjects need to answer questions 
both above and below their reference point. Here the simplicity with the EG method makes it 
  15 
easy to let the subjects answer several of similar questions with different stakes. The 
probability weighting effect can change the risk preferences in similar ways as diminishing 
sensitivity, which makes a separation of them needed to analyze the response from the 
experiment (Harrison 2011). EG is a good alternative because it does not change probability 
and thereby does not include probability weighting in the analysis. When probability 
weighting is excluded it limits the evaluation of the prospect theory, but it is not the focus of 
the study. With a similar method as Tanaka et al. (2010) it would be hard to give an answer 
about the reference point that the subjects are affected by, without adding several more series. 
 
An experiment can change the probability or the outcome to examine how the participants 
change their decisions from a risk perspective. Eckel and Grossman (2002; 2008) used fix 
probabilities and changing outcomes. It is more common to change the probability of the 
outcome in experiments, as Holt and Laury (2002) did. Dave et al. (2010) conclude that if the 
test changes outcome instead of probability, a subject with lower mathematical skills will 
understand the test easier and gives a less noisy result and it is vital for this study get a less 
noisy result since it uses a small sample.  
 
This study uses EG’s method but with nine options in every gamble situation as Reynaud and 
Couture (2012). This makes it possible to have both risk-averse, risk-neutral and risk-seeking 
options. This study uses six risk-averse chooses, one risk-neutral choice, and two risk-seeking 
options. The subjects’ answers five gambles situations with different stakes, to test their risk 
preferences both over and under their reference point. All probabilities in the experiment are 
50 %, to make it simpler for the subjects. 
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3 Methodology 
 
This chapter describes the methodology and designs this study uses to answer the research 
questions. It also includes a discussion about the quality criteria of the study and what ethical 
considerations have been done in the study.  
 
 Philosophical worldview 
In most research the researchers’ philosophical ideas are not revealed for the reader, however, 
they do still affect the research with design choice and view of knowledge. Creswell (2014) 
states that the researcher should reveal their philosophical worldview, to explain why their 
research is done the way it is. This study follows Creswell’s (2014) description of the term 
worldview as beliefs that guide actions, others have called these paradigms epistemologies 
and ontologies. The researcher found himself in the paradigm that the literature discusses as 
post-positivism. Creswell (2014) describes the post-positivist worldview as a paradigm that 
tries to identify causes for different outcomes or the most likely reasons because post-
positivists do not believe in the notion of any absolute true knowledge. This is shown in this 
study when the researcher tries to identify the relationship between revenue target and risk 
preference. The post-positivistic researchers are often found in the more quantitative research 
where they try to verify theories. This deductive approach to research is also something that 
this study uses when trying to verify the use of reference points described in the prospect 
theory. 
 
The researcher in this study believes in Creswell’s (2014) description of the post-positivist’s 
intention with the study, to test great ideas with small discrete test and by that reduce the 
world into a set of measurable variables. These variables are often created from careful 
observations and developed into numeric variables. This is also the method used by this study 
when Kahneman & Tversky (1979) description of a reference point is used in a simple test to 
find out the relationship between revenue target and decision making.  
 
 Research approach 
This study follows a quantitative research approach with an experimental research design. 
The literature describes the quantitative approach as an approach that enables the study to 
analyze trends in the field and explain why something occurs, as an overall tendency of 
individuals’ behavior (Creswell 2012). This makes the quantitative approach a good fit since 
this research aims to find a relationship between variables. The approach also follows a more 
standardized structure, compared to the qualitative approach, which increases replicability of 
the study and makes it easier to test findings on other samples or populations (Creswell 2012; 
Bryman & Bell 2015). Replicability is important for this study because it uses a new model to 
test reference points and it is crucial to test it on other samples and populations to validate the 
model and results. A quantitative approach fits in with the researcher’s post-positivistic 
worldview and his wish to develop relevant statements (Creswell 2014).  
 
This study uses an experimental design. Quantitative researchers can use experimental design 
to determine whether an activity makes a difference in the result (Creswell 2014). The 
experimental design is chosen in this study because of its ability to test the influence of a 
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treatment (Creswell 2014). There are other methods to examine farmers' risk preferences, for 
instance, a case study that can give an in-depth insight into how the farmers think, which 
other methods cannot give. However, a case study comes with response bias and the insights 
effects are harder to measure and link to the prospect theory (Chidambaram et al. 2014).  
 
The dependent variable in current study is individuals’ risk preferences and it is treated with 
different stakes in gamble situations. The experiment uses a single-subject design since with 
the aim to analyze individuals (here farmers) and use that information to explain the group. 
Creswell (2012) describes the single subject design as a design where the subjects become 
their own control and thereby that make the control group obsolete. The single-subject design 
does also focus on trends in the answers and not only the answers in themselves.  
 
 Literature review  
A literature review is a summary of journal articles, books and other documents about a 
subject (Creswell 2012). In this study, the literature review is in the theoretical perspective 
chapter and it is a thematic literature review. Creswell (2012) describe the thematic literature 
review as, a literature review that divides the literature in themes and discuss the major ideas 
instead of single studies. This approach is used in this study to get a greater explanation of the 
prospect theory and to create the experiment from eliciting methods. The search for literature 
is conducted on the internet and thru Google Scholar. For the utility theory search is keywords 
as “prospect theory”, “expected utility theory”, “reference point”, and “loss aversion”. Mainly 
literature that is written by Kahneman and Tversky is used since they are the main authors of 
the prospect theory, but also other articles that have more focus on reference points.  
 
For the risk eliciting methods the focus is to find and evaluate different methods. To do this is 
the focus on summaries and handbooks that evaluate the methods as handbooks and 
summaries provide an overview of the literature with pros and cons. The keywords in the 
search are “field experiment”, “experimental methods”, “risk preferences” and “eliciting 
methods”. When the eliciting methods are found and chosen, the original sources of the 
methods included in the literature review.   
 Sample selection 
The sample is a vital part in most quantitative research since it determines what data that is 
collected (Creswell 2012). The researcher needs to identify the people and organizations, 
which generates the data needed to answer the research question. To be able to identify the 
subject in a study most a unit of analysis and a population be specified. This study uses a 
small sample due to the amount of time and planning needed to conduct a larger data 
collection. Hackshaw (2008) describe the strength and limitations with small samples as they 
are good because they can give fast answers to new research ideas. Small samples, however, 
lead to problem with the interpretation of the result, with large standard error and wide 
confidence interval. Another limitation related to studies with small samples relates to the 
generalizability and reliability of the results. However, a well-designed small sample study 
can create good conclusions that can be used in larger studies later (Hackshaw 2008).   
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3.4.1 Unit of analysis  
The unit of analysis in this study is the individual potato farmer. Grünbaum (2007) argues that 
the unit of analysis is important in research to describe the analysis. According to 
Pinsonneault & Kraemer (1993), the unit of analysis can be divided into six classes; 
individuals, working group, department, organization, application or project. The unit of 
analysis is related to the research question and it is defined as the potato farmers as separate 
individuals. Individuals as the unit of analysis are chosen to be able to compare the 
differences within the farmer’s choice. It would be able to see all potato farmers as a group 
and answer how potato farmers’ make decisions. However, in such case the study would not 
been able to analyze the individual farmer’s risk preference changes due to reference points.  
 
3.4.2 Population description  
By choosing a part of the population, a researcher creates a possibility to get more 
homogenous population and more appropriate sample. When using a more homogenous 
population it is easier to control for characteristics of subjects that might affect the 
relationship between the independent and dependent variables (Creswell 2012).  
 
The chosen population in this study is active potato farmers in Sweden who cultivate at least 
two hectares autumn/winter table potatoes. The subject needs to be active potato farmers to 
understand the different revenues and uncertainty with potato cultivation. There are different 
sorts of potato cultivations and the table potatoes sell mostly to retail stores, peeling firm, 
packing plants or direct to consumers. Where the industry potatoes cultivators can sell to the 
processing industry as starch or crisps potatoes. The biggest difference between the table and 
industry potatoes is that the industrial potatoes are sold on contracts with fixed prices and the 
table potatoes are sold on a spot market without any fixed prices. That is why this study only 
focuses on table potatoes since it can create a more homogenous sample in the price risk 
domain.  
 
In 2018 there were 2568 table potato producers in Sweden according to Swedish Board of 
Agriculture statistic, which cultivated 15992 hectares of potatoes (Jordburksverket 2018). The 
number of potato producers are overestimated in the statistic from the Swedish Board of 
Agriculture since some producers use other farmers land to produce potatoes. The table 
potatoes market is dived into two main groups: new potatoes (20%) and autumn/winter 
potatoes (80%) (Jordburksverket 2018). The new potatoes market starts when the first 
potatoes leave the ground in May. This market is characterized by a high price at the 
beginning and the price decreases until the end of the season. The autumn/winter potatoes 
have more constant price over the season but can change from season to season. The large 
price difference during the season can make it difficult to understand revenue targets per 
hectare since the harvest time is so vital to the outcome. Törnquist (2015) describe that 60 
percent of the farmers cultivate less than two hectares, these are excluded from this study 
since there cultivation is so small that can have problem to answer some of the questions. It is 
about 1000 farmers in the selected population. 
 
3.4.3 Sample  
The population work as a frame that the sample can be picked from (Creswell 2012). There 
are two main sampling methods probability sampling and nonprobability sampling. The 
sampling method a study choose is depending on several factors, the amount of rigor the 
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study seeks, characteristics of population and availability of participants to the study. In 
probability sampling, creates a sample of individuals that is representative of the population. 
This is the most rigorous sampling method and creates internal validity and a greater ability to 
generalize from the sample. Nonprobability sampling is not as rigorous as probability 
sampling and it creates a sample from individuals that are available, convenient, or 
representative for some characteristic that the study seeks (Creswell 2012).  
 
This study uses a nonprobability sampling since its ability to reach as many potato farmers as 
possible. According to Cook et al. (2002) disappears most of probability samples advantages 
when the response rate is low, and it is vital to this study to get as many participants as 
possible. This study uses two methods to find participants. First, a convenience sample where 
the survey is sent out from an organization to its members, further in the report referred to as 
Sample 1. Secondly, a convenience sample where the survey diffused on social media 
(Facebook and LinkedIn), further in the report referred to as Sample 2. They are separated 
since Sample 1 is a more homogenous sample because they sell their potatoes together. It 
does also create a possibility to compare the samples in the analysis.  
 
 Experimental design  
The subject is tested with the test described in the Conceptual framework (2.3). At the 
beginning of the test, the subjects get information about the test and what real life situation it 
simulates. The experiment is divided into five different lottery tests with different stakes that 
should represent an uncertain situation of potato cultivation. Where the subjects choose the 
favorable cultivation option. All the farmers in the study are treated units and are exposed to 
the same multiple treatments. Charness et al. (2012) describe a limitation that occurs when 
just using one treatment and it is that it becomes harder to evaluate changes between the tests. 
This due to the changes can both come from the different stakes and the fact that the subjects 
answered a similar question before  
 
The experiment is based on EG’s (2002) method and as it every option has two possible 
events a high outcome and a low outcome and all probabilities in the experiment is 50 % to 
make it simpler for the subjects (2.3). Table 3 shows the payoff for the first test of the five 
tests. The low payoff decreases with 3750 SEK between every Cultivation option for the first 
six options. After that the decreases is changed to 1875 SEK for the seventh and eighth option 
and the last decrease is 7500 SEK for the low payoff. The subject does not get information 
about the expected payoff for the options. The potential revenues in gambles are derived from 
what is a possible average revenue per hectare and are controlled by potato cultivation 
consultants and the pilot study. The average revenue per hectare is believed to be 75 000 
SEK. This amount is in the second most risk-seeking alternative in the first gamble (lowest 
stake gamble) and is the safe option in the last gamble (highest stake gamble). This to be able 
to involve the average revenue in all risk classes from risk-seeking to most risk-averse 
cultivation options. This creates a possibility for a farmer with a reference point at the average 
revenue and high diminishing sensitivity, to answer both risk-seeking and risk-averse options 
in the different gambles and still be maximizing the utility in the gamble situations.   
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Table 3. EG test 1 
Choice Event Payoff Probability (%) Expected payoff CRRA ranges 
1 A 37500 50 %   
 B 37500 50 % 37500 r>4.91 
2 A 33750 50 %   
 B 45000 50 % 39375 1.64<r<4.91 
3 A 30000 50 %   
 B 52500 50 % 41250 0.75<r<1.64 
4 A 26250 50 %   
 B 58750 50 % 42500 0.55<r<0.75 
5 A 22500 50 %   
 B 65000 50 % 43750 0.43<r<0.55 
6 A 18750 50 %   
 B 71250 50 % 45000 0.20<r<0.43 
7 A 16875 50 %   
 B 73750 50 % 45312.5 -0.26< r <0.20 
8 A 15000 50 %   
 B 75000 50 % 45000 -0.36< r <-0.26 
9 A 7500 50 %   
 B 78750 50 % 43125 r <-0.36 
 
Table 3 shows the payoff in the first EG test the other tests have higher payoffs and the stakes 
increase from the first test with factors of 1.28, 1.52, 1.76 and 2, the factors are adapted to get 
more even numbers. By using CRRA the risk coefficient for each option is constant for all the 
stakes. All cultivation options with an r-value >0.20 are referred to as risk-averse options (1-
6) and all options with an r-value <-0.26 is referred to as risk-seeking options (8-9) and the 
last option as risk neutral (7). When the CRRA values is the same over the stakes to 
understand how the stakes affect the subjects’ willingness to take risks near there reference 
point is enabled.  
 
This study also includes a risk preference questionnaire. The questionnaire that is used is 
Hansson and Lagerkvist (2012) questionnaire for farmers as it has been validated on Swedish 
farmers. Both DOSPERT and Hansson and Lagerkvist (2012) questionnaire is domain 
specific, however, some of the questions in the DOSPERT questionnaire is quite aggressive 
like “Having an affair with a married man/woman". This type of question can lower the 
willingness to respond, therefore the method is not chosen. Hansson and Lagerkvist (2012) 
questionnaire works as a control test for the farmers and their risk preferences.  
 
 Data collection 
Gathering of data to evaluate the potato farmers' preferences is performed through a survey 
because there is no previous data available. The survey has a self-reporting preference 
approach to reveal farmers' preferences. The survey has four parts, first some entering 
question, just to be able to tell the people who are not in the population that they do not have 
to answer any more questions. After that, the EG experiment with five gamble tests. The next 
part is Hansson and Lagerkvist risk preference questionnaire and finally questions about the 
potato cultivation and revenue targets.  
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The survey is created in Netigate, which is an online survey program. A Survey program is 
preferred due to its ability to retrieve more information from the responders' through 
measuring and controlling their actions when answering the survey. In addition, when the 
survey is net-based the possibility to reach participants over a larger area increases, without 
any addresses. The farmers in Sample 1 get three reminders with two weeks apart. Sample 2 
involves social media and is posted three times on different channels. The diffusion on social 
media does not reach the same people every time. One problem with this diffusion is that the 
number of potato farmers that is given a chance to answer the survey is unknown. 
 
The subjects in this experiment are not paid. In most experiments the subjects are paid based 
on how they answer, to ensure real incentives (Harrison & List 2004). This study uses 
different stakes to understand changes in behavior. When using different stakes, it is 
important to avoid incentives to another stake because the incentive to be paid can be greater 
than the incentive to answer the favorable gamble option. To create a small incentive the 
farmers are offered to receive a summary of the risk assessment from the researcher. In 
addition, Holt and Laury (2002) have found that there are no significant differences in the 
observed decisions between gambles situation with hypothetical or real payoffs. 
 
Before the survey was sent out to the potato farmer a pilot test was performed. A pilot test 
was done to determine if the subjects in the study are capable to participate in the survey and 
if they understand the questions (Creswell 2012). The pilot study involved potato farmers and 
potato consultants to test and comment on the survey before the real survey was distributed. 
To secure an industry-specific language and representative values in the survey. The test 
round was during the first week of March 2019. The data collection of the final survey was 
later the same month. 
 
 Experiment analysis  
This section describes the study’s analytical framework, which is based on previous studies 
and the theoretical perspective. The analysis describes the data and test it to evaluate the 
farmers’ risk preferences. To summarize the self-reported risk preferences part is a factor 
analysis performed (Hansson & Lagerkvist 2012). To analyze the data from the survey, this 
study uses Statistical Package for the Social Science (SPSS) and Excel. 
 
3.7.1 Coding and cleaning the data  
When the experiment is finished, the data from the sample is displayed using descriptive 
statistics including mean and standard deviation. It is also presented in a graphical manner to 
get a better understanding of the data and detect whether there are some odd behaviors or 
outliers (Creswell 2012). All subjects that does not belong in the stated population are 
removed from the analysis. There are some main questions that the participants need answer 
to be included in the analysis such as, the five EG tests and revealing their revenue target. The 
revenue target is a sensitive variable since it is filled in by the subject. If a subject answer in 
thousands of SEK instead of SEK (80 instead of 80 000) this is corrected by the researcher 
and counts as a valid number. Other answers which are not possible revenue targets on the 
lower side are removed because the researcher cannot know if the subject has an extremely 
low revenue target or if the participants have stated their profit target. Outliers on the high 
side that is non-possible revenue target such as 600 000 (which is eight times as big as the 
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estimated revenue) is treated as if the subject just added an extra zero by mistake and is 
counted as 60 000.   
 
3.7.2 Factor analysis  
To be able to evaluate the information from the risk preference questionnaire this study uses a 
factor analysis. This is the same analysis that Hansson and Lagerkvist (2012) used on the 
questionnaire. This study uses SPSS for the factor analysis. The factor analysis is chosen 
because it has been validated for this questionnaire. As extraction method this study uses 
Maximum likelihood since it can compute a wide of set indexes to describe the goodness of 
fit for the model (Osborne et al. 2008). This study uses a rotated factor analysis, the method 
for the rotation is Direct Oblimin. The most common rotation method is Varimax (Osborne et 
al. 2008). This study does not use Varimax since it cannot evaluate data that is correlated. The 
data in the questionnaire is most likely correlated since all questions involve risk and that is 
why this study uses the Direct Oblimin. To evaluate the quality of the factor analysis this 
study uses two measurements. First, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure for the model. 
The KMO can be between 0 and 1 and needs to be over 0.5 for the matrix to be considered as 
suitable for factor analysis (Williams et al. 2010). The second quality measure is the factor 
loading that needs to be over 0.3 in factor loading. Williams et al. (2010) state that 0.3 is the 
minimum factor loading that should fit in factor analysis and the factor loading should 
preferably be over 0.5 to be significant. The factor loading of 0.3 is lower than the 0.4 that 
Hansson and Lagerkvist (2012) used to be significant in their study. To decide the numbers 
factor is the most common way to examine the Eigenvalues (Williams et al. 2010). According 
to some literature is all factors with an Eigenvalue over 1 are valid factors. However, Osborne 
et al. (2008) state that the number of factors is adjusted to the data and not follow the rule of 
the thumb, which is also how this study chooses the number of factors.  
 
To test the reliability of the factors in the factor analysis is Cronbach’s alpha is used. 
Cronbach’s alpha should be between 0.7 and 0.9 (Tavakol & Dennick 2011). A too low value 
indicates poor inter-relatedness between items and the items should be reviewed or discarded. 
An alpha that is too high indicates that some of the items are redundant and testing the same 
question in a different guise.  
 
3.7.3 Dependent test  
To evaluate farmers’ risk preferences this study uses a combination of within and between-
design, to create more understanding about the respondents (Charness et al. 2012). The 
within-design focuses on what is it that changes the subjects risk preferences and how the risk 
preferences change over different stakes. The most common used rank correlation method is 
the Spearman rank correlation (Creswell 2012). The Spearman rank and Kendall correlation 
can compare a continuous independent variable with a continuous dependent variable (Croux 
& Dehon 2010). However, Croux and Dehon (2010) did show that the correlation 
measurement is more robust and efﬁcient than Spearman rank correlation for small sample 
sizes. Therefore, do this study uses Kendall correlation and not the more commonly used 
Spearman rank. 
 
To the between-design a couple of focus variables are chosen and divided into two groups to 
be able to see differences between different groups. The statistical tests that are used for the 
between-design is the Mann–Whitney U test. Both Kendall correlation and Mann–Whitney U 
can be used on non-parametric data (Creswell 2012). 
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3.7.4 Reference point test  
To analyze whether the subject’s responses depend on the revenue target as a reference point, 
a simple model is created. The model estimates what cultivation option the subject should 
choose in the different stakes if the subject was following a reference point. The model is 
built on three criteria. The first criterion, to estimate a cultivation option the farmers’ revenue 
targets needs to be possible to reach in the test. As an example, if the subject’s revenue target 
is 80 000 SEK, the model will not to estimate a cultivation option for that subject in the first 
test, due to the highest possible outcome in that test is 78 750 SEK. The second criterion, the 
subject is estimated to choose the most risk-averse option that is over their revenue target. The 
option can both be risk-seeking and risk-averse and differ over the EG test, due to that 
individuals are risk-seeking in losses. However, the subject will choose the most risk-averse 
option due to loss aversion. The final criterion, the subject is estimated to choose the most 
risk-neutral alternative when the lower outcome in the option is over their revenue target. This 
makes the subject act more risk-neutral when the stake goes up over their revenue target. As 
an example of the model, a subject with a revenue target at 75 000 is estimated to choose the 
risk-seeking option 8 on the first test and the totally risk-averse option 1 in the last test.   
 
This model does focus on loss aversion to examine the reference point. This is explained by 
the prospect theory as the kink in the utility curve at the reference point and that a loss is more 
painful than a similar gain (Kahneman & Tversky 1979). This makes the subjects reference 
point hunters that will try to reach the reference point in this model, where they are estimated 
to choose the option that makes them reach their reference point. The last part where the 
subject is estimated to be more risk neutral is also explained by loss aversion because when 
the loss domain of the utility curve disappears becomes the overall utility curve straighter and 
the subject should act less risk-averse.  
 
 Quality criteria 
Validity and reliability are two fundamental elements in the evaluation of instruments and the 
results of a study (Creswell 2014). The instruments can be surveys, interviews or other tests. 
The instruments can measure everything from the adoption of innovation to the subjects’ risk 
preferences. Validity concerns to what extent the instrument measures what it is intended to 
measure. The reliability on the other hand refers to the ability the instrument has to be 
consistent in its measurements. Reliability and validity are closely connected. For an 
instrument cannot be valid if it is not reliable, but it can be reliable without being valid.  
 
3.8.1 Reliability  
Creswell (2012) describe several tests and methods to check if the collected data and result 
are reliable, for instance, using summaries measurement to avoid errors in one question and 
control variables as Cronbach’s alpha. This study uses factor analysis to summarize items to 
factor to get more reliable answers and Cronbach’s alpha and KMO to test the reliability in 
factor analysis.  
 
3.8.2 Validity  
The possibilities that the final ideas are not correct is something that experimental designs 
need to address (Creswell 2012). There are some different types of validity that is important 
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in experimental research. They are construct, external, statistical conclusion, and internal 
validity. Cook et al. (2002) state that experimental research needs to focus on construct, 
external, and statistical conclusion validity instead of internal validity. This because if a 
researcher focuses on increasing internal validity, it can be at the cost of decreased construct 
or external validity and reduce the validity of the study (Cook et al. 2002). The different 
validity measures are discussed from this studies perspective below.   
 
Construct validity refers to the validity of the experiment and if it tests the right thing or 
construct (Salkind, 2010). It is the special treatments, observations, and settings on which 
collected data are transferable to a more abstract construct that the experiment wants to 
measure (Cook et al. 2002). This study focuses on understanding the revenue target as a 
reference point and it is no previous studies to relay on, which would make it clear if the 
study measures what it wants to measure. To ensure construct validity this study uses eliciting 
methods that have been validated to measure risk preferences. This experiment also ensures 
construct validity by using the CRRA coefficient for risk preferences that several other 
studies have used and reached valid results. The study uses two different analysis methods to 
create a possibility to triangulate and control effect on the risk preferences. Also, Hansson and 
Lagerkvist’s (2012) questionnaire is validated to test risk preferences, these control variables 
create construct validity since they all measure risk preferences from different perspectives. 
Nevertheless, the conclusions about the reference point need to be confirmed by other studies 
to be fully generalizable.  
 
External validity is the validity that describes if the causal relationship holds outside the 
sample, to other individuals, settings, treatment, outcomes (Cook et al. 2002). To increase the 
generalizability to the wider population it is important to select an appropriate sample, which 
is not possible in this study because the subjects are not selected. However, this study control 
for how appropriate the sample is. The study does also control for differences in the factors, 
where the sample is not appropriate. Another vital part of external validity is the 
generalizability over time (Creswell 2012). This is discussed in the method discussion to 
describe how the result can differ over time. At last, it will be hard to generalize from this 
study due to the small sample since it comes with high risk for an inappropriate sample. When 
the sample is small is the result sensitive for extreme subjects, which can change the results. 
Extreme subjects in this study can be very risk-averse subjects with a high reference point 
(revenue target), which makes him act less risk-averse in the EG tests, but still, act more risk 
averse than the farmers with lower reference points. This study does not control for any 
overall risk preference and that makes this type of problem more problematic. 
 
Statistical conclusion validity is reached by using appropriate statistical methods and 
understanding of the statistical result (Creswell 2012). This is created by using analysis 
methods that have been validated on the test, for instance, factor analysis for Hansson and 
Lagerkvist questionnaire. This study also uses robust tests as Kendell tau rank and Mann–
Whitney U test to decrease the possibility that extreme subjects in the small sample affect the 
statistical result. To understand the independent and dependent variables earlier studies are 
used and discussed, both when creating the test and analyzing the result. 
 
Internal validity relates to the possibility to conclude from the cause and effect relationship 
between the independent and dependent variables (Creswell 2012). This can best be created 
by using a probability sampling, which ensures that the researcher does not need to worry 
about many assumptions about the sample (Cook et al. 2002). However, this study does not 
use probability sampling and by that internal validity from the sample selection is low. The 
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researcher believes that the total validity of the study would have been decreased if it had 
used a probability sampling. First, since fewer people would have answered the survey and by 
that a smaller part of the population. Secondly, when using probability sampling and the 
response rate is low, the benefits of using a probability sample is low (Cook et al. 2002). 
Instead of using probability sampling is concepts from earlier studies are used to create better 
internal validity. For instance, the age effect is controlled because of Hardaker et al. (2015) 
state that age affects risk aversion. 
 
3.8.3 Ethics  
In any research, it is vital to ensure the subjects well-being, dignity, and rights (Creswell 
2012). In an experiment ethics are even more important since the researcher uses treatments 
on the subjects (Creswell 2012). The treatment in this study cannot harm the subjects and all 
get the same treatment. The subjects are informed that the survey is voluntary. The subjects 
are normally paid in experimental studies (Harrison & List 2004). To avoid any deception, it 
is even more ethical crucial to inform the subjects in this study, that the survey is voluntary 
and what they can get from participating. This is done on the opening letter to the survey were 
the subjects are informed about the focus of the study and that they can get a summary in 
Swedish if they participate, to avoid any deception problem.  
 
The subjects in the study are anonymous to avoid any registration of personal data. Not even 
the researcher knows who has been answering the survey since it used an open link when the 
survey is distributed. This to avoid any subjective analysis of the answers. It is also important 
to inform the subjects what data is collected and how it will be used, both to avoid deceiving 
the subjects and follow the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) directive. GDPR 
directive demand that all personal data that is processed is done so in a lawful, fair and 
transparent way (Mourby et al. 2018). This information has been given to the subjects in the 
opening letter of the survey and no personal information is stored except e-mail addresses to 
the people that want a summary. To avoid any connection to the subjects are the email 
addresses not stored with or connected to any answers.  
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4 Empirical data 
 
This chapter will give an understanding of the data and how it relates to the population and 
other studies. The chapter starts with a description of the subjects and the average answer on 
every question and their relation to the population. After that is the result of the experimental 
test described. The web-based questionnaire was closed after 5 weeks with a total of 36 
participants. Of these 36 participants, 23 had completed the entire survey. 21 were valid 
responses that contributing to the analysis. Below, the personality and demographics of the 21 
respondents that will be in the main analysis are presented. 
 
 Demographics  
Table 4 shows the demographics of the respondents in this study. The result is for the 21 valid 
after all in valid answers is removed.  
 
Table 4. The potato farmers’ demographics.  
  Average  Std.  N Min Max SUM 
Gender (% Men)  86% 
 
21 0 1   
Age 50.8 11.6 21 24 72   
Year as an active potato farmer 25.4 12.3 20 5 47   
Household's total income depending on potato cultivation (%) 44% 31% 21 2% 100%   
Yield in tonnes per hectare Autumn/Winter table potatoes 45.2 11.0 21 26 78   
Cultivated land of potatoes 28.3 25.2 21 5 100 595 
Production of Autumn/Winter table potatoes (tonnes) 1147 1240 21 46.5 5100 24080 
Revenue target per hectare for the potato cultivation (SEK)  
(1 euro= 10.5 SEK)  
92 857 34 517 21 50 000 175 000   
Amount of the cultivation that is irrigated 58% 43% 21 0% 100%   
Autumn/Winter table potatoes of the potato cultivation (%) 87% 24% 21 5% 100%   
New potatoes of the potato cultivation (%) 10% 21% 21 0% 95%   
Industry potatoes of the potato cultivation (%) 3% 12% 21 0% 50%   
 
 
 Potato farmer 
 
The potato farmers’ age was between 24 and 72, with a mean of 51. In Sweden, 49 % of the 
Crop farmers are over 60 and just 4 % under 35 (Jordburksverket 2017). Of the 21 subjects 
were it three women (14 %). The same number for Swedish crop farmers is 11%. Gender 
distribution within the respondent group is near the average in the sector and there are only 
three women because of that will this study not analyze any gender differences. The average 
farmer has cultivated potatoes for 25 years and all farmers have been cultivating potatoes for 
at least five years. This makes their answers about their potato cultivation trustworthy since 
all are experienced potato farmers. However, one farmer stated more years as an active potato 
farmer than years old and his result for years active were removed from the answers. Figure 6 
shows the education distribution of the subjects. Most of the participants in this study have a 
Post-secondary education within an agricultural area. 
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 Figure 6. Education distribution (Own processing) 
 
 Potato cultivation 
 
The potato farmers in the study cultivates at an average of 28 hectares of potatoes within the 
range of 5 to 100 hectares per farmer. The total amount for the 21 subjects is 595 hectares, 
and the total amount for all the 36 participants is 933 hectares. In Sweden, it is 15993 hectares 
potato cultivation (Jordburksverket 2018). One farmer cultivated less than two hectares of 
autumn/winter potatoes, he is excluded from the analysis since he is not in the stated 
population. Most of the 21 farmers cultivate most autumn/ winter potatoes, however, one 
farmer cultivates most fresh potatoes and only a smaller amount autumn/winter potatoes.  
 
The potato cultivation is important for the farmers with an average importance for the 
household economy of 44%. There are only two farmers that state importance under 15%. 
The revenue targets that the farmers’ states are between 50 and 175 thousand SEK per 
hectare. The average potato farmer states a revenue target at 93,000 SEK per hectare. As, one 
farmer stated a revenue target at 20,000 SEK per hectare was removed from the further 
analysis because 20,000 is too low to be a revenue target. The average farmer state that he can 
irrigate is 58% of the cultivation, with most farmers at either 0 or 100%.  
 
The average yield from the autumn/winter potatoes is 45 tonnes per hectare. 45 tonnes per 
hectare is eleven tonnes over the average yield for table potatoes in Sweden (Jordburksverket 
2018). There are two explanations to the difference, the statistical average yield of 34 tonnes 
per hectare include fresh potatoes, and most farmer in this sample comes from Halland. The 
farmers in Halland have the highest yields in Sweden with 38 tonnes per hectare, including 
fresh potatoes with lower yields. More than half of the farmers in this study are active in 
Halland (Figure 7). Halland is one of the bigger potato areas in Sweden with 11% of the 
potato cultivation. The overrepresentation of farmers from Halland is an effect of that the 
organization that sends out Sample 1 is active in Halland. All the respondents from Halland 
and Skåne County are in Sample 1.  
 
The average total harvest of autumn/winter table potatoes is 1150 tonnes per farmer and 
24080 tonnes in total. These 24080 tonnes equals to 5% of the total production of 
autumn/winter potatoes in Sweden. With all the 36 participants in the study included, they 
make up 7% of the total production of autumn/winter potatoes in Sweden. 
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Figure 7. County distribution (Own processing) 
 
 EG tests  
The gamble experiment consists of five tests with different stakes in each test. Table 5 shows 
the statistics for the five tests. In the tests is 9 the most risk-seeking and 1 is the most risk-
averse while the risk-neutral respondent chooses 7.  
 
Table 5. Experiment statistics  
 
Average for the 
subjects all 5 tests 
Std. for the 
subjects’ average of 
the 5 tests 
Test 1 
 Smallest stakes Test 2 Test 3 Test 4 Test 5 
N 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 
Mean 4.41 1.08 4.81 4.48 4.33 4.14 4.29 
Median 4.2 0.89 4 4 4 4 4 
Std. Deviation 1.65 0.63 2.21 2.17 1.68 1.82 2.05 
Skewness .737 0.92 .576 .904 1.223 .914 .647 
Minimum 2.20 0 2 2 2 2 1 
Maximum 8.20 2.72 9 9 9 8 9 
 
The respondents’ mean in the EG tests was 4.4. This shows a risk-averse behavior in general 
in the group of subjects. The subjects’ individual means range from 2.2 to 8.2 with only one 
subject that has a mean over 7 and shows a risk-seeking behavior in this test. The subjects’ 
consistency in their answer varies from one subject that is entirely consistent on all tests to 
another subject has a standard deviation on 2.7 on his five tests. 
 
The results from the EG tests reveal the subjects’ risk preferences. The results in the tests can 
be described with a CRRA coefficient, which describes the individuals risk preferences 
gamble situation. The subjects’ mean and median value is four or near four and that option 
has a CRRA coefficient at 0.55<r<0.75. The mode value is three and it has a CRRA 
coefficient at 0.75<r<1.64. The cultivation option three involves a wider range of CRRA 
coefficients compared to the less risk-averse option. Due to this range difference, it is better to 
use mean and median values than the mode value. The CRRA coefficient becomes 0.65 if 
when using the midpoint of the range.  
 
The ability to compare the mean is depending on the skewness of the data. The data in, all 
answers are skewed and by that not normally distributed. Also, the different skewness can be 
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a limitation to the analysis. The skewness of the answers to the tests is from 0.576 on test 1 to 
1.223 on test 3. There can be a problem with such a large difference in Skewness if they don’t 
look the same. Figure 8 shows the distribution of the answers for the different tests.  
 
 
Figure 8. Distribution on answers on Test 1-5(Own processing) 
 
 Risk preferences questionnaire  
The risk preference questionnaire is divided into two parts. The first part showed in Table 6 
obtains actions that stabilize the net income. The subject ranks the actions from 1 to 7, where 
1 means not important and 7 very important. The second part in Table 7 focuses on actions 
that can cause volatility for the net income. Here the subjects also rank the actions from 1 to 
7, where 1 stands for to a small extent and 7 to a large extent.  
 
Table 6. Stated positive preferences  
 Actions to obtain a stable net income Average  Std.  N Min Max 
1.    Paying bills on time 6.05 1.43 21 2 7 
2.   Using a checking account or other short-term credit options to their full extent 4.95 1.66 21 2 7 
3.   Having a balanced crop rotation 6.14 0.85 21 4 7 
4.   Maintaining a low debt-equity ratio 4.24 1.18 21 2 7 
5.   Having full insurance 5.76 1.37 21 3 7 
6.   Diversifying farm activities 5.10 1.67 21 1 7 
7.   Participating in machinery collaboration or contract machinery 4.62 1.80 21 1 7 
8.   Purchasing inputs in good time 5.38 1.60 21 1 7 
9.   Regularly testing machinery such as sprayer and seed drill 5.81 1.40 21 3 7 
10.  Practicing minimum tillage 3.90 1.73 21 1 7 
11.  Continually discussing the business with professional advisors 4.90 1.61 21 2 7 
12.  Searching for information before making decisions 5.81 1.50 21 1 7 
13.  Having thorough, documented monitoring of production 5.48 1.21 21 4 7 
14.  Producing the highest quality, even if this implies e.g. having to work more 6.00 1.10 21 4 7 
15.  Following regulations (e.g. for environmental subsidies) 5.52 1.40 21 3 7 
16.  Having employees 4.05 2.16 21 1 7 
17.  Having newer and well-maintained machinery 5.38 1.56 21 2 7 
18.  Having access to temporary help if needed 4.24 1.89 21 1 7 
19.  Having access to crop drying and storage facilities (either own facilities or through 
collaboration with other farmers) 
5.48 1.91 21 1 7 
20.  Selling on contract 3.90 1.67 21 1 7 
21.  Participating in study circles and courses that are relevant for the business  4.43 1.57 21 2 7 
22.  Having good contact with neighbors 5.10 1.79 21 1 7 
23.  Having time to participate in social activities 4.57 1.78 21 1 7 
24.  Thinking progressively and searching for possibilities to develop the business 6.14 0.96 21 4 7 
25.  Getting family to share thoughts about the business and getting them to support the work 5.52 1.50 21 1 7 
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Table 6 shows what the participating farmers stated as the most important actions to stabilize 
the income. Comparing to the answers in Hansson and Lagerkvist (2012) study with the same 
questioner the mean valued for the items were similar. The biggest difference is in 
Maintaining a low debt-equity ratio were the subjects in this study answer 1.01 lower than in 
Hansson and Lagerkvist (2012) study. The Having newer and well-maintained machinery, on 
the other hand was 1.01 higher in the current study compare to Hansson and Lagerkvist 
(2012). The social actions Having good contact with neighbors and Having time to participate 
in social activities was 0.69-0.88 lower in this study compared to Hansson and Lagerkvist 
(2012) study 
 
The farmers states that: Thinking progressively and searching for possibilities to develop the 
business; Having a balanced crop rotation; Producing the highest quality, even if this implies 
e.g. having to work more; Paying bills on time as the most important actions, all with a mean 
at six or over. All these means except paying bills on time is higher in this study compared to 
Hansson and Lagerkvist (2012) study. The farmers’ states that the least important are: 
Practicing minimum tillage; Selling on contract; Having employees. It is the same three as in 
Hansson and Lagerkvist’s (2012) study with the only difference that having employees is 0.91 
higher in this study.  
 
 
Table 7. Stated negative preferences  
Actions that can cause volatility for the net income Average  Std.  N Min Max 
1. Not paying bills on time  4.71 2.12 21 1 7 
2. Not using a checking account or other short-term credit options to their full extent 4.43 1.99 21 1 7 
3. Not working with a balanced crop rotation  4.62 2.06 21 1 7 
4. Not maintaining a low debt-equity ratio  5.00 1.61 21 1 7 
5. Not having full insurance  4.57 2.09 21 1 7 
6. Not diversifying farm activities  4.38 1.80 21 1 7 
7. Not participating in machinery collaboration or contract machinery 4.29 1.85 21 1 7 
8. Not purchasing inputs in good time  4.48 2.02 21 1 7 
9. Not regularly testing machinery such as sprayer and seed drill 4.38 2.04 21 1 7 
10. Not practicing minimum tillage  3.76 2.05 21 1 7 
11. Not continually discussing the business with professional advisors 4.24 1.89 21 1 7 
12. Not searching for information before making decisions  4.86 1.98 21 1 7 
13. Not having thorough, documented monitoring of production 4.57 1.66 21 1 7 
14. Not producing the highest quality, if this implies e.g. having to work more 5.00 1.97 21 1 7 
15. Not following regulations (e.g. for environmental subsidies) 4.33 2.03 21 1 7 
16. Not having employees  3.95 1.88 21 1 7 
17. Not having newer and well-maintained machinery  4.19 2.14 21 1 7 
18. Not having access to temporary help, if needed  4.14 1.85 21 1 7 
19. Not having access to crop drying and storage facilities (either own facilities or through 
collaboration with other farmers) 
4.19 2.20 21 1 7 
20. Not selling on contract  3.62 1.63 21 1 7 
21. Not participating in study circles and courses that are relevant for the business 3.43 1.96 21 1 7 
22. Not having good contact with neighbors  3.67 2.13 21 1 7 
23. Not having time to participate in social activities  3.67 1.96 21 1 7 
24. Not thinking progressively and searching for possibilities to develop the business 5.00 2.02 21 1 7 
25. Not getting family to share thoughts about the business and getting them to support the 
work 
4.52 2.09 21 1 7 
 
Table 7 shows what the participating farmer states as the factors that create most volatility for 
the net income. Comparing to the answer in Hansson and Lagerkvist’s (2012) study is the 
answers in this study lower with an average of 0.4. The only action with a mean that is more 
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than 0.2 higher than Hansson and Lagerkvist (2012) study is Not having employees, which is 
0.6 higher. The biggest differences are in the social factors such as Not having good contact 
with neighbors and Not having time to participate in social activities, where the mean is 1.3 
higher in Hansson and Lagerkvist’s (2012) study.  
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5 Analysis 
 
This chapter starts with a factor analysis for the risk preference questionnaire. This is 
followed by a dependent test, with Kendall's correlation and Mann Whitney U tests. Finally, 
the reference point test to examine how dependent the farmers are of their revenue targets as a 
reference point. 
 Factor analysis  
It was possible to create a factor analysis for the benefit side but not for the perceived risk 
side, due to a large correlation between the items. The data set is small, and it creates a 
problem for the factor analysis to build significant factors, due to the ratio between numbers 
of participants and items is under 1 (Osborne et al. 2008).  
 
The perceived risk domains have several positive correlations between items that are over 0.9 
and 20 of the 25 items have a correlation over 0.75 to at least one other item. It would have 
been possible to create a factor analysis, but it would not represent the individuals’ self-
reported preferences and not possible to replicate. Later in the analysis is only the average 
answer for all the perceived risk domains that are tested as a factor for the risk preferences. 
Hansson & Lagerkvist (2012) did also have higher correlation between the items on the 
perceived risk side but they were able to create factors.  
 
A factor analysis is created for the benefit domains, due to the small number of participants it 
was necessary to reduce the items in the analysis (Table 8). The items with the lowest KMO 
measure for the individual statement were removed one by one. To be able to increase the 
total KMO coefficient for matrix. When the KMO coefficient for the matrix did reach 0.5 
were instead the items with the lowest factor loadings removed one by one, until all factor 
loadings were over 0.3. The final version of the factor analysis is shown in Table 8 and it is a 
rotated factor matrix with 15 items and three factors. Ten items have been removed to create a 
valid factor analysis (with a larger sample would it probably be more items in the final 
matrix).  
 
The lowest Eigenvalue on the three factors is 2.5, a fourth factor would have an Eigenvalue of 
1.3. However, in this case, three factors much larger Eigenvalues than a couple of factors near 
1 and that is why this study just creates three factors. The final matrix has a KMO measure of 
0.554 for the whole model and 0.448 to 0.665 for the individual statements. The Cronbach's 
alpha for all the factors is over 0.75, which is good and creates reliability to the factors 
(Tavakol & Dennick 2011). 
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Table 8. Rotated factor matrix, benefits domains  
 
Factors 
1.Benefits from 
being in the 
social 
environment 
2. Benefits from 
planning and 
carefulness as an 
individual farmer  
3. Benefits from 
being well informed 
and leaning from 
others 
23. Having time to participate in social activities 1.000     
21. Participating in study circles and courses that are 
relevant for the business 
0.682     
22. Having good contact with neighbors 0.662     
5.  Having full insurance   0.960   
8.  Purchasing inputs in good time   0.764   
15. Following regulations (e.g. for environmental 
subsidies) 
  0.742   
9.  Regularly testing machinery such as sprayer and 
seed drill 
  0.721   
13. Having thorough, documented monitoring of 
production 
  0.573   
14. Producing the highest quality, even if this implies 
e.g. having to work more 
  0.510   
24. Thinking progressively and searching for 
possibilities to develop the business 
  0.356   
11. Continually discussing the business with 
professional advisors 
    0.953 
25. Getting family to share thoughts about the business 
and getting them to support the work 
    0.749 
4.  Maintaining a low debt-equity ratio     0.536 
12. Searching for information before making decisions     0.522 
17. Having newer and well-maintained machinery     0.429 
Cronbach's alpha 0.822 0.855 0.785 
Inter-item correlation 0.485-0.68 0.143-0.795 0.123-0.703 
Corrected item-total correlation 0.63-0.776 0.445-0.871 0.396-0.727 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling matrix 0.554 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of individual statement 0.448-0.665 
Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.  
Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization. 
Rotation converged in 5 iterations. 
 
 
 
Table 8 shows the three factors and the items in them. The items have factor loadings from 
0.356 to 1. There are no items in the model that have a factor loading over 0.35 to other 
factors than the one they are in. Below follows a description of the three factors and after that 
Table 9 which shows the correlation between the factors. 
 
Factor 1 comprises three items, which all relate to social interaction with other people. These 
are items reflecting a person that is described with Benefits from being in the social 
environment. This factor consists of items with high factor loadings, between 0.6 and 1, which 
creates a significant factor 
 
Factor 2 comprises seven items that mostly relate to security of a yield. The items include: 
having full insurance; following regulations; buying inputs in good time; producing the 
highest quality; testing and controlling the machinery and production. These are items 
reflecting a person that is described with Benefits from planning and carefulness as an 
individual farmer. This factor has diversified factor loadings from 0.35 to 0.96. The low 
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factor loading on thinking progressively and searching for possibilities to develop the 
business makes it to a less significant item for the factor.  
 
Factor 3 comprises five items that mostly focus on getting information and advice from 
others, but also on protecting oneself against large unexpected financial costs. Except for the 
part with the high financial cost, these the items reflecting a person that is described with 
Benefits from being well informed and learning from others. This factor has diversified factor 
loadings from 0.43 to 0.95. According to Williams et al. 2010 do factor loading needs to be at 
0.5 to be significant the factor, due to that is not having newer and well-maintained machinery 
with 0.43 significant but is still important for the factor. 
 
Table 9. Factor correlation matrix factor analysis 
 
1. Benefits from 
being in the social 
environment. 
2. Benefits from 
planning and 
carefulness as an 
individual farmer. 
3. Benefits from 
being well informed 
and leaning from 
others. 
1. Benefits from being in the social environment. 1.000 0.031 0.000 
2. Benefits from planning and carefulness as an 
individual farmer. 
0.031 1.000 0.171 
3. Benefits from being well informed and leaning 
from others. 
0.000 0.171 1.000 
 
Table 9, shows that there is low or even no correlation between the factors. This means that 
the factors do not affect each other and the subject risk references for the different factors can 
differ. 
 
Hansson and Lagerkvist (2012) did have more answers on their survey which contributed to a 
more robust factor analysis where they did not need to reduce the numbers of items as much 
as this study. The factors in this study cannot be directly transferred to the factors Hansson 
and Lagerkvist (2012) study in part because this study use fewer items and because the factors 
describe different behavior.  
 
 Dependent test 
The relationship between the factors is tested in two tests. In Table 10 is the subjects divided 
into two groups and are tested to see differences between the groups. The groups are chosen 
from different focus factors to understand how the factors change the answers. In Table 11 is 
the correlation tested to show the dependence between different factors. 
 
The factors in Table 10 are the following: Sample, the survey is divided into two samples, 
Sample 1 and Sample 2; Time, this controls if there is any difference between the respondents 
that answer the survey fast or slow, the first group did answer the survey in less than 20 min; 
Irrigation possibility, irrigation is a vital risk-reducing action for many potato farmers, this 
test if there are any risk preference differences between the farmers, with lower or higher 
possibility irrigate. The first ones have an irrigation capacity of less than 60% of the potato 
cultivation and then those with more than 80% of the cultivation. The gap between the groups 
is only there to reinforce the difference between the groups and it is no farmers between the 
groups; Average harvest, first the ones that have an average harvest at 45 tonnes per hectare 
or less, then the ones with a higher harvest; Total harvest, control for the larger farmers that 
have a harvest of over 900 tonnes autumn/winter table potatoes. The first are the ones that 
have a total harvest under 800 tonnes then the ones with over 900 tonnes; Active years, the 
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first is the farmers that have been active for less than 30 years; Revenue target, this is the 
main factor in the analysis and first, are the subjects that have a revenue targets at 80 000 
SEK per hectare or less. After that comes the ones with a revenue targets over 100 000 SEK 
per hectare; Part of household income, the first is the ones where the household is less than 
35% dependent on potato cultivation and then those where the household economy is more 
50% dependent on potato cultivation; Agrarian University, the first is the subjects that have 
an education from an agrarian university and then the rest; Halland, the first is the subjects 
that have their potato cultivation in the county of Halland and then the rest; Age, first is the 
subjects that are under 50 years old.  
 
 
Table 10. Factor relationships, Mann Whitney U test 
 
Average all 
EG test 
EG test 1 EG test 2 EG test 3 EG test 4 EG test 5 
Average all subjects 4.41 4.81 4.48 4.33 4.14 4.29        
Sample 1 4.29 4.79 4.14 4.14 4.14 4.21 
Sample 2  4.66 4.86 5.14 4.71 4.14 4.43        
Time < 18 min 3.95 4.27 4.00 4.18 3.64 3.64 
Time > 20 min 4.92 5.40 5.00 4.50 4.70 5.00        
Irrigation possibility < 60% 4.89 5.18 4.73 4.45 4.91 5.18** 
Irrigation possibility > 80% 3.88 4.40 4.20 4.20 3.30 3.30**        
Average harvest ≤ 45 
tonnes/ha 
4.96 5.33 4.78 4.67 5.00 5.00 
Average harvest > 45 
tonnes/ha 
4.00 4.42 4.25 4.08 3.50 3.75 
       
Total harvest potatoes < 800 
tonnes 
4.65 5.00 4.50 4.42 4.67 4.67 
Total harvest potatoes > 900 
tonnes 
4.09 4.56 4.44 4.22 3.44 3.78 
       
Active years < 30 4.47 4.67 4.50 4.33 4.42 4.42 
Active years > 30 4.33 5.00 4.44 4.33 3.78 4.11        
Revenue target ≤ 80 000 
SEK/ha  
3.51*** 3.82* 3.27*** 3.64 3.27** 3.55 
Revenue target ≥ 100 000 
SEK/ha 
5.40*** 5.90* 5.80*** 5.10 5.10** 5.10 
       
Part of household income < 
35 % 
4.70 4.90 4.50 4.80 4.60 4.70 
Part of household income ≥ 
50 % 
4.15 4.73 4.45 3.91 3.73 3.91 
       
Agrarian University 4.47 4.86 4.43 4.36 4.29 4.43 
Not an Agrarian University 4.29 4.71 4.57 4.29 3.86 4.00        
Halland 4.53 4.91 4.36 4.27 4.45 4.64 
Rest of Sweden 4.28 4.70 4.60 4.40 3.80 3.90        
Age < 50 4.38 4.70 4.40 4.40 4.30 4.10 
Age ≥ 50 4.44 4.91 4.55 4.27 4.00 4.45 
*. Extracted P-value at the 0.10 level (2-tailed). **. Extracted P-value at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) ***. Extracted P-value at the 0.01 level (2-
tailed) 
 
Table 10 shows the mean in the EG tests for the chosen factors. There are some differences 
for most of the factors, however, there are only significant differences in mean for the 
Revenue target and Irrigation possibility. When focusing on the EG tests it is the difference 
between the tests and how they are correlated that is interesting. Overall are no big differences 
between the tests. To be able to understand how the different stakes effect the individual is 
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correlation used. Table 11 shows that the correlation of EG test 1 to the other EG tests has a 
decreasing trend with the size of the stake, from a positive correlation at 0.809 for EG test 2 
down to a positive correlation at 0.195 for EG test 5. The correlation between EG test 1 and 5 
is not significant. EG test 3 has however a high correlation to all other EG tests, with positive 
correlation coefficients at 0.467-0.667. EG test 4 is also highly positive correlated with EG 
test 5, with a correlation factor at 0.77. Below are the differences that are because of the 
Revenue target, Benefits from planning and carefulness as an individual farmer, and some 
other factors analyzed.  
 
5.2.1 Revenue target  
The revenue target has a highly positive correlated with choice in EG tests. The farmers with 
revenue targets over 100 000 SEK are also less risk-averse. For the average cultivation option 
is the difference significant with an extracted P-value at 0.01 in a Mann Whitney U test 
between the farmers with low and high revenue targets. The Kendall's correlation in Table 11 
between the average cultivation option and revenue target is significantly positive correlated 
with a P-value under 0.01 and a correlation factor at 0.466.  
 
Separately, the five different tests vary with a correlation from highly significant to non-
significant. The correlation factors are positive and between 0.285 and 0.478 and there is no 
trend in the correlation (Table 11). Accordingly, the Mann Whitney U test does show a 
similar result, with significant differences in EG test 1, 2 and 4. The subjects with low 
revenue targets have no trend over the five tests. For the subject with high revenue targets, it 
is however a shift after the first two tests with mean answers at 5.9 and 5.8 down to 5.1 for the 
three remaining tests.  
 
The mean CRRA coefficient is 1.2 for the subjects with low revenue targets and 0.49 for the 
subjects with high revenue targets. The difference in revenue target range from 50 –- 175 
thousand SEK. This difference is too big to be explained by higher goal if the less risk-averse 
farmers. These CRRA coefficients are in line with Reynaud and Couture's (2012) study on 
French farmers that did derive on an average CRRA coefficient of 0.62 and 1.02 respectively 
for a low and a high payoff. 
 
Looking at the results with an empirical lens, the average farmers rather forgo a 6.6% increase 
in expected revenue to avoid that the low income decrease with 35.7%. The farmers with a 
high revenue target do forgo an increase of 3.6% in expected revenue to avoid that the low 
income decrease with 25%. These costs of risk are high, and it can be a potential problem for 
the table potato sector, if the farmers cannot reduce their risk.  
 
5.2.2 Benefits from planning and carefulness as an individual farmer  
Benefits from planning and carefulness as an individual farmer are the factor with the highest 
correlation to the EG tests, with a positive correlation to the average cultivation option at 
0.522 and a P- value under 0.01 (Table 11). To further clarify, the correlation between the 
average cultivation option and benefits from planning and carefulness as an individual farmer 
is positive. It applies if the farmer that state that these questions secure the income from the 
farm, is also less risk-averse. The average benefits from the preference questionnaire are also 
significant at a level under 0.05 and a positive correlation value at 0.343. However, the 
benefits from planning and carefulness as an individual farmer are derived from the benefits 
side in the self-reported preference questionnaire, so probably is a correlation for the average 
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benefits the same correlation as the one in benefits from planning and carefulness as an 
individual farmer. Also, this is confirmed by that Average benefits and Benefits from 
planning and carefulness as an individual farmer is highly correlated with each other.  
 
On the separate tests is the correlation positive and highest on test 1 and 2 with a correlation 
at 0.585 and 0.653 (Table 11). In test 3, 4 and 5 is the correlation positive but lower with 
correlation values from 0.362 to 0.278. However, all correlations are significant except for 
EG test 5.    
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Table 11. Factor correlation matrix Kendall's correlation 
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 Reference point test  
The reference point test is an estimations model described in 3.7.4 Reference point test, with 
the purpose to test how much the farmers’ answers are dependent on their revenue target. The 
model estimated answers from most risk-seeking to most risk-averse. Only six of the 21 
subjects got an estimation on EG test 1. The rest of the farmers had to high revenue targets. 
The model estimated 80 responses of a total of 105 tests. 
 
The model estimated 14 right answers of a total of 80 estimated answers, with the accuracy of 
18% (see blue marked squares in Table 12). This is slightly higher than a random pick with an 
accuracy of 11%. The mode answer three would have given 26 right answers from the 105 
tests. However, the model gives an answer that has an error that is one or less 53 times of the 
80 answers or accuracy of 66%, (see green market squares in Table 12). Compared to the top 
three mode values that would have given 64 right answers or accuracy of 61%. The mean 
deviation of the estimations is 1.5 with a standard deviation of 1.4. The mean deviations for 
the separate tests are highest on EG test 2 with 2.1 and lowest on EG test 4 with 0.9 in 
deviation mean.  
 
The estimation model has better results when the expected risk-neutral revenue in the EG tests 
is close to the farmers’ revenue targets. When estimating the answers where the farmers’ 
revenue target is less than 17 thousand away from expected risk neutral revenue, gives the 
model 10 right answer and 31 answers, with an error at one or less in 37 estimations, showed 
in the light green field in Table 12. These estimations have an accuracy of 27% right answers 
and 84% with an error at one or less.   
 
Table 12. Reference point test 
Revenue 
target 
EG test 1 EG test 2 EG test 3 EG test 4 EG test 5 
50 000 4 3 1 3 2 1 4 2 2 3 3 0 3 4 1 
50 000 4 3 1 3 2 1 4 2 2 5 3 2 5 4 1 
50 000 4 3 1 3 2 1 3 2 1 2 3 1 2 4 2 
60 000 2 5 3 2 3 1 3 2 1 2 1 1 2 3 1 
70 000 5 6 1 5 4 1 4 3 1 4 2 2 5 1 4 
75 000 3 8 5 3 4 1 3 3 0 2 2 0 1 1 0 
80 000 6 
  
5 5 0 4 4 0 4 3 1 5 2 3 
80 000 6 
  
4 5 1 5 4 1 4 3 1 3 2 1 
80 000 3 
  
4 5 1 4 4 0 3 3 0 5 2 3 
80 000 3 
  
2 5 3 3 4 1 3 3 0 3 2 1 
80 000 2 
  
2 5 3 3 4 1 4 3 1 5 2 3 
100 000 9 
  
9 9 0 9 6 3 4 4 0 4 3 1 
100 000 7 
  
7 9 2 4 6 2 4 4 0 4 3 1 
100 000 7 
  
7 9 2 7 6 1 5 4 1 3 3 0 
100 000 5 
  
4 9 5 2 6 4 2 4 2 2 3 1 
100 000 3 
  
3 9 6 3 6 3 3 4 1 3 3 0 
100 000 2 
  
3 9 6 5 6 1 6 4 2 7 3 4 
120 000 8 
  
6 
  
6 
  
7 6 1 6 5 1 
125 000 9 
  
9 
  
6 
  
8 6 2 9 5 4 
175 000 5 
  
6 
  
6 
  
8 
  
8 
  
175 000 4 
  
4 
  
3 
  
4 
  
5 
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6 Discussion 
 
In this chapter, the result of the survey and analysis is discussed with earlier research and its 
implications for the farmer and the potato sector overall. Also, the method and the 
generalizability of this study are discussed.  
 
 Potato farmers risk preferences  
The farmers’ risk aversion can lower the production since the average farmer does rather 
forgo a 6 % increase in revenue if it contributes to an increased in the revenue volatility. In a 
market, that functions well is this not a problem due to that other actors can take over the risk 
from the farmers. However, this is not as easy in the potato market as in other markets due to 
the structure of the market. The potato market lacks these simple risk transfers methods as 
price hedging or other price insurances.  
 
A price hedging system for table potatoes would make it easier for the farmers to plan their 
production and by that decrease the price risk in their production (Miller et al. 2004). When 
the farmers can plan their production increases also the efficiency in their cultivation. 
However, as Tomek and Gray (1970) argue, it is not sure that a hedging system would have 
any positive effect on the potato market due to the potato itself. One of the main price-setting 
factors in other hedging markets as wheat is the stock that can be transferred to next year 
(Tomek & Gray 1970). The table potato market does not transfer any potato stock between 
seasons and the stock should empty in June the year after harvest, which contributes to more 
price uncertainty before the harvest. This is something that is shown in Figure 1 where the 
potato price fluctuates more between the years than the wheat price. In a potato price hedging 
market would the risk for the buyer because there are no stock and the price premium the 
farmer needs to pay.  
 
The price of potatoes depends on the total harvest that season (Tomek & Gray 1970). This 
gives a natural hedge for the farmers since when the yield is lower increases the price (Miller 
et al. 2004; Hardaker et al. 2015). Other crops that have a larger world market becomes this 
hedge low, but since the potato market is mostly a local market with few farmers becomes 
this hedge larger. The natural hedge and the fact that there is no interseasonal stock make it 
harder for an outside actor to move risk from the farmers through a hedging market. This 
because the outside actor would have a harder time predicting prices and the risk premium 
that the potato farmer would be willing to offer would be low due to the natural hedge. This 
makes it possible for a cooperative solution were the farmers help each other just to avoid the 
full damage from a total crop failure that the natural hedge doesn’t protect against. 
 
From the factor analysis, three factors were created the first factor Benefit from being in the 
social environment. This factor involves social risks that are indirect risks for the farmer 
(Miller et al. 2004). This factor does not have any correlation to the answers in EG tests 
(Table 11). The lack of correlation indicates that these two risk domains are separate from 
each other and the farmer's view of social relations does not affect how the farmer takes risks 
in his cultivation. These results confirm earlier studies from Weber et al. (2002) and Reynaud 
and Couture's (2012) conclusions that social risk preferences are separated from financial risk 
preferences and the result in EG tests.  
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Benefits from planning and carefulness as an individual farmer factor have proven to affect 
the risk preferences in the EG tests. This factor includes actions that Miller et al. (2004) 
describe as risk-reducing actions, with actions as having full insurance, buy inputs in good 
time and follow regulations. These actions can describe a farmer that does not want to take 
any risk. Nevertheless, the farmers that rank this factor as more important for reducing 
volatility in the result are less risk-averse in the EG tests. This inconsistency can be explained 
by the differences in the measurement of risk behavior between the tests. The EG tests focus 
only on a person’s willingness to take risks compared to Hansson and Lagerkvist’s (2012) 
questionnaire were the farmer should rank different actions. It is likely that the farmer that is 
more offensive and take risks in the cultivation also needs and finds the actions that can save 
him if something goes wrong. Hardaker et al. (2015) and Miller et al. (2004) describes, to 
reduce production risk can the farmer create strategies to avoid a destroyed harvest. These 
strategies can involve the actions in Benefits from planning and carefulness as an individual 
farmer factor and do not avoid the farmer from maximizing the revenue. Instead, developing 
strategies can increase revenues from cultivation. As a nonagricultural example, the person 
who climbs Mount Everest takes more risk than other people. However, the same person does 
probably have better risk awareness than others when it comes to health and food because the 
person needs it.  
 
Benefits from being well informed and leaning from others factor does not affect the answers 
in the EG tests. Most of the actions that are included in this factor involve getting information 
before making decisions. This to be able to make better decisions and by that lower the risk. 
When the individuals have more information can the decisions be made rational and 
maximize the utility as according to Edwards (1954). The farmers that see these actions as 
actions that reduce the volatility of the result do by that want to take more rational decisions 
to reduce their risk. The farmers in the EG test do have the full information with clear 
possibilities which make it possible to make rational decisions. However, with real-life 
decisions is it not possible to make these rational decisions (Simon 1990). This means that 
this factor can have a different effect on real-life decisions as the EC test lacks uncertainty in 
the decisions. 
 
When the potato farmers are risk-averse, affects it the potato market. First, there is a possible 
consequence that the farmers choose not to grow potatoes at all since it is a risky crop. This 
creates a risk premium for the potato farmer which create higher profits for the farmer that 
still cultivate potatoes. The technology risk in the potato cultivation can make it even harder 
for farmers to enter the potato market because of the large initial cost for special machinery 
(Acs et al. 2009). This hinders risk-averse farmers from start cultivate potatoes. However, this 
study did find that the potato farmers are not less risk-averse than the farmers in Reynaud and 
Couture's (2012) study. That potato farmers are not less risk-averse even if they grow a risky 
crop that potatoes can cause even more farmers to stop cultivate in the future.  
 
Another effect farmers risk-aversion have on the potato market is that they will produce 
potatoes less effective. That effect could come from farmers that use more plant protection 
products than the economically and environmentally optimal amount to reduce the risk of 
pests or perhaps not use plant beneficial products due to production risks (Miller et al. 2004). 
This would make the average potato farmer less profitable in their cultivation.  
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 Reference point  
The potato farmers’ risk preferences have been tested in this thesis, to understand how it is 
affected by the revenue target as a reference point. The estimation model is very simple but 
did show some interesting results. The model estimated the right answer for the whole 
spectrum of choices from the most risk-averse to the most risk-seeking in the EG test. The 
estimation model had, however, some problems with the predictions when estimating choices 
were expected revenue is far away from the revenue target. This tendency goes against that it 
is the right utility curve that is estimated. Koop and Johnson (2012) advocate that a person 
uses more than one reference point in their decisions. This can be a possible explanation to 
the tendency in the answers since further away from the reference point might another 
reference point affect the decision. It would also be explained by Tversky and Kahneman’s 
(1991) explanation of reference point as something that is not fixed and do change due to 
other expectations. When the possible outcome is low or high might the reference point shift 
due to the expectation of outcome have changed and not because of the risk preferences have 
changed. The EG tests do use an interval of outcomes and it is that the expectations are 
created from. These closed intervals change the expectation of possible outcomes and by that 
change the reference point in the test. The expectations of possible loss or profit over the 
target can disappear so the reference point can change. It becomes by that hard to see if the 
changes risk preferences come from changing reference point, loss aversion or diminishing 
sensitivity.   
 
Heath et al. (1999) state that the subjects make decisions based on their targets to achieve 
their goal. Also, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) point to the same direction with the S-shaped 
utility curve where the marginal utility is highest just under the reference point. This extra 
willingness to reach the revenue target is visible in by certainty in the answers from the 
farmers. However, the farmers do not have any big kink in their answers. It can be that there 
is no clear reference point or just a problem with the EG test. Also, Eckel and Grossman 
(2002) did not find any signs of a kink in the utility curve due to loss aversion. The EG 
method may have a problem with detecting loss aversion from how the gambles are created. 
This can depend on how the gambles are created with closed intervals, which can change the 
expectations and by that changing reference points. However, it needs more research to 
conclude any answers.  
 
The differences in the CRRA coefficient between the stakes can also reveal the reference 
point. There are no big trends overall but a downward going trend for the subject with high 
revenue targets (revenue targets over 100 000 SEK), where the average goes from 5.9 in test 1 
to 5.1 in the last three tests. These subjects cannot reach their revenue targets in EG test 1 and 
2. These farmers are by that only acting in their loss domain if the revenue target is their 
reference point. The shift in risk aversion after test 2 can be a result of a risk-seeking behavior 
in the loss domain or loss aversion, which is proposed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) in 
the prospect theory. With the explanation that diminishing sensitivity in the loss domain 
makes the farmers with high revenue targets less risk-averse in test 1 and 2. In the same way 
that Tversky and Kahneman (1991) did prove that the difference between a loss of 100 and 
200 is larger than between 1100 and 1200. Loss aversion can also explain the shift between 
the first two EG tests and the later ones because the utility curve has a kink at the reference 
point and if the choice options are only in the loss domain there is no kink. Without the kink, 
the utility curve becomes straighter and shows the same behavior as lower diminishing 
sensitivity and less risk aversion.  
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The small sample makes it hard to evaluate any exact trend in the answers and if they follow a 
certain reference point. Also, the possibility of other monetary targets that can affect the 
references point makes it hard to evaluate the real reference point. These other targets can be 
profit goals or cultivation costs both with and without labor costs. Also, the problem to 
determine if the changed risk preferences come from a change in reference point, loss 
aversion or diminishing sensitivity, which makes it even harder to determine a reference point 
for the potato farmers. However, the farmers are affected by their revenue targets when they 
make decisions. 
 
 Generalization from this study  
When generalizing from this study it is important to understand the sample and construct of 
the study. To be able to generalize from a sample it is important to have an appropriate 
sample to create external validity (Cook et al. 2002). The sample in this study differs from the 
stated population in some parameters, which can make it inappropriate. The farmers in this 
study have higher potato harvest per hectare than the average potato farmer and more of them 
are from Halland. The fact that several of the farmers are from Halland can be both positive 
and negative for the generalizability. This due to that a larger sample in one area makes the 
sample more appropriate for that area and easier to generalize to other areas (Cook et al. 
2002). In this study with a sample were a lot of the farmers come from Halland can create a 
more generalizable sample than a sample with a more appropriate distribution between the 
areas, because it reduces the effect of other disturbing factors. However, the subjects from 
Halland are all potato farmers from Sample 1 that is farmers who sell their potatoes together. 
When selling together can the price risks be affected due to the same selling procedure, and 
this can make it more uncertain to generalize to other farmers, however, there are just small 
differences between Sample 1 and 2 answers.  
  
When generalizing from a study it is vital to know what the study has examined. This study 
focused on risk preferences and used two tests in the survey to examine them. Both these tests 
should measure risk preferences with two different focus. The results show that higher risk 
awareness for the factor Benefits from planning and carefulness as an individual farmer and 
questions from Hansson and Lagerkvist’s (2012) questionnaire overall are positively 
correlated with less risk aversion on the EG tests. The positive correlation goes against that 
they would both have measured risk preferences due to if they did it would have been a 
negative correlation. Both the tests have been validated to measure risk preferences in 
different settings, so the inconsistency in the result is probably in the construct. As discussed 
earlier measure the tests different things first do the EG test measure a will to maximize the 
revenue even if the risk increases. Secondly, Hansson and Lagerkvist’s (2012) questionnaire 
does measure the stabilizing effect action has on the result. When people have well function 
strategies with actions will they be risk-averse in some domains but can still try to maximize 
their revenue. When generalizing from this type of studies it is important to know what type 
of risk domain the study has controlled for.    
 
 Method discussion  
There are some limitations to this study from how it is executed. The sample size is small, 
with only 21 valid full answers and a total of 36 responders to the survey. There is two 
explanation to the low numbers of full answers. The length of the survey, the survey had a 
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median time of just over 20 minutes. Also, that survey is sent out during planting season in 
April. Hansson and Lagerkvist’s (2012) study was also a long survey that was sent out during 
April and they had a response rate below 50%, which they explained to the length of the 
study. The length of this study did probably contribute to the fact that 13 of the 36 participants 
in the study did not fulfill the survey.  
 
6.4.1 Sending period 
The survey was sent out during April, which most likely affects the results of the study in 
several ways. First, it can be hard to fir the subjects to answer the survey because of the work-
intense period. Secondly, the sending period is important since the reference point is 
influenced by aspirations, expectations, and norms (Tversky & Kahneman 1991). Tversky and 
Kahneman (1991) describe that the reference point is never stable and can change by a change 
in expectations. For potato cultivation revenue expectations not stable over the season due to 
production risks that affect the yield and price fluctuations that affect the selling price. These 
expectations change that can affect the reference point and needs to be accounted for when 
sending out the survey. As an example, the summer drought in 2018 probably had influenced 
the subjects' revenue expectations and by that the reference points during that season due to 
lower expected yield. This makes it harder to compare revenue targets in the middle of the 
season when the crop already has been affected by production risk as weather conditions. If 
the survey is sent out during a time of the year where the current season does not affect the 
result. It will also be easier to generalize from the study because the external validity would 
be increased.   
 
The best time to send out a survey that tests on potato farmers’ revenue targets is probably in 
January or February. This is not the most intensive work period and the farmers can allocate 
time to answer the survey. It is also a good time to avoid seasonal effect on the reference 
point because the current year’s potato cultivation has not yet affected the reference point and 
it has been a few months since last year's harvest. 
 
6.4.2 Level of stakes  
In a study like this is it important to use the right level of stakes, which evaluating the answers 
on different stakes. The estimation model in this study could only estimate six of the 21 
subjects on the first test because most farmers had higher revenue targets than expected. 
Furthermore, two subjects had too high revenue targets to be estimated in any test. The utility 
curve that Kahneman and Tversky (1979) describe in prospect theory is S-shaped and when 
using too low stakes is only the curve under the reference point estimated. It would have been 
preferable to have slightly higher stakes to get more information about the farmer. Mostly to 
be able to get more information about how they act when the stakes go above their revenue 
targets. When lacking that information in this study, it becomes hard to estimate the full effect 
of loss aversion. Now the answers to the EG tests were divvied into three groups (1-2, 3 and 
4-5) that have a high correlation between the tests within the group but less between the 
groups. This increases the ability to have a slightly greater distance between the stakes 
without losing any descriptive ability for the small changes. 
 
To get a more explanatory result the stakes should probably change a bit. The lowest stakes 
for this population would preferably be increased with a few thousand SEK. The distance 
between the stakes can be increased to be able to get more describing results. With the result 
from this study, it would be better to have a difference between the stakes of 50 % of the first 
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stake, because this would contribute to an understanding of the larger trends in the utility 
curve. This would give a safe value at 40 thousand on the first test and 120 on the last test.  
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7 Conclusions 
 
The current study aimed to get a wider understanding of potato farmers’ risk preferences and 
include revenue target as a reference point. Two main theoretical conclusions can be made. 
First, the monetary targets as revenue targets affect the decision making and it can explain 
how farmers make larger decisions. This study cannot conclude that the revenue target is a 
reference point because it uses a small sample and that there is no large kink in the answers 
which would have been a sign of a reference point.  
 
The second theoretical conclusion is the importance of understanding what type of risk 
preferences a certain risk preference questionnaire or eliciting method control for. The two 
risk preference tests (EG tests and Hansson and Lagerkvist’s questionnaire) were used to 
measure risk preferences obtained opposite results. From this inconsistency, this study 
concludes that the tests measure the risk preferences in two different domains. The first 
domain reflects the will to increase the expected revenue even if it comes with more risk. The 
second domain reflects the will to do actions and build up strategies to secure the result. 
These domains are connected because the farmer that wants to increase the profit also needs 
to face higher risks in the production, which creates a need for actions and strategies that 
secure the result and lower the risk. Unlike the farmer who makes the same safe choices every 
year and will not need a well-structured strategy of actions to reduce the risk in the 
production.  
 
The empirical conclusions arise from that the potato farmers are risk-averse and that this can 
be a potential problem for the sector in Sweden since it can make the farmers less productive. 
The risk aversion can result in lower production of foodstuff in Sweden, something that 
would mean that it will be impossible to reach the aim of the national food strategy, with an 
increased part of domestically produced foodstuff. However, if it becomes possible for the 
potato farmers to reduce their risk or become less risk-averse, it would instead stop or even 
turn around the negative trend with a lower number of farmers that cultivate potatoes. Price 
insurance can reduce the price risks however the potatoes own specific with a fluctuated price 
and no interseasonal stock will make it hard to create a market with price insurance. There are 
other ways for the farmer to reduce his risk in several domains for instance, would an 
increased the number of potato products reduced the quality risks.  
 
To make the potato farmers less risk-averse in the price and production domains based on this 
study can conclude that the farmers need to become more aware that their action makes a 
difference. This due to those farmers who perceive the risk-reducing effects from action as 
monitoring and test the cultivation and machinery or feel the security insurances and follow 
the regulations are also less risk-averse in decisions that can increase their income. For 
advisors and policymakers, it is therefore important to understand that the farmers need to 
believe in the risk-reducing actions and create risk-reducing strategies to become less risk-
averse in their potato cultivation decisions. 
 
In the real-life decisions that the farmer makes is not as clear as the decisions in the EG tests 
the farmers get two possible outcomes and comes instead with a lot of uncertainty. This 
uncertainty can change the decision that the farmer makes even more for the farmers that 
want to make rational decisions with full information. In this study did the will of making 
rational decisions not affect the risk preferences, however it is not clear how this factor affects 
potato farmers’ decisions about their cultivation.   
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There are some limitations related to the conclusion in this study due to the size of the sample. 
The small sample reduces the reliability of the results and creates a need for a replication to 
be validated. With the small sample comes also the problems with how appropriate the 
sample is because it does not represent the whole stated population and by that give less 
reliable conclusions. These generalization problems can be reduced with a replication study 
on potato farmers or farmers with similar products that can validate the conclusions from this 
study. 
 
Another limitation of the presented research here is that price and production risk has been 
studied as a single variable. This has resulted in that any difference in risk aversion between 
price and production risks has not been detected. For the potato market with several large 
risks, it is vital to understand price and production risk aversion separately. This is something 
future research should focus on to create a better understanding of farmers’ risk preferences.   
 
This study does not use any control group, which can be a limitation to the study since potato 
farmers cannot be viewed as a group compared to others. This study compares the result to 
other studies with farmers, but it does still limit the possibility to conclude if the potato 
farmers risk-aversion compared to other farmers. Also, limits the possibility to understand 
why the farmers cultivate a risk crop like potatoes. This study does only use farmers’ answers 
in the analysis and not any real decisions they make in their potato cultivation. In future 
studies this is something that can be included, however, this most come with a larger ethical 
consideration because it means that the farmers reveal more personal information.  
  
Furthermore, it is still a need for more studies that involve subjects’ non-status quo reference 
points, because it is a vital part to determine what theoretical perspective decision making 
should have and build models from.  
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 Appendix 
 
Survey on income uncertainty 
Hi. 
We conduct a study on how potato growers make decisions when the outcome is unknown. It is 
voluntary to participate but your participation would be very helpful in understanding how potato 
growers’ income uncertainty affects the farmers’ behavior. The study examines how your choices are 
uncertain situations and return goals affect how you make decisions in your potato cultivation. 
 
The study is conducted by the Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences (SLU) and your answers 
will only be used for research purposes. The study is also completely anonymous, which means that 
your answers cannot be connected to you as a person. You can get a summary in Swedish about the 
results of the study if you state your mail on the last page of the study or send me an email via the 
address below. Again, this will not be recorded along with your responses. 
 
The study intends to lead to an increased understanding of how the large variation in returns affects 
the behavior of potato growers. Understanding can then be used to better design help for the individual 
farmer. For instance, in the form of calculation basis or risk diversification products such as harvest 
insurance and custom sales contracts. We have estimated that it takes about 25 minutes to answer the 
entire questionnaire. 
 
Thanks in advance Daniel Pettersson 
For questions about the study, please contact me by email: dapn0003@stud.slu.se or telephone 0734-
349415. 
 
Anonymous questionnaire - For research purposes only 
 
1. During a normal year, how does the distribution look between different kinds of potatoes in your 
cultivation? (Divide 100% into the following three categories.) 
1. Autumn and winter table potatoes 
2. New potatoes 
3. For Industry (Chips, Starch, etc.) 
4. Other 
 
If you do not grow any autumn/winter food potatoes, you can stop here. Thanks for your participation. 
2. How much of your cultivation do you have the opportunity to irrigate? 
 
3. When you grow autumn/winter food potatoes what is your average harvest per hectare for harvest in 
August or later? 
 
4. How many hectares of potatoes do you grow a normal year? 
 
You should now answer five consecutive tests on which income distribution you prefer to get from 
your potato cultivation. In the test, we consider situations with financial risks in the shape of income 
uncertainty from potato cultivation. Income includes only sales value and not your costs for growing 
potatoes. The differences between the five tests are that the safe-income changes. A test consists of 9 
different cultivation alternatives where you should choose the cultivation alternative as you 
 prefer. Where the first is a safe choice, everyone then increases the higher income and the lower 
income drops. All consist of identical probabilities (50/50). Since there are only two levels on each 
proposal, the situations become hypothetical, but we ask you to answer them as if you were facing a 
real cultivation decision. 
 
Example: 
In the first test, you are faced with a choice of income with a safe cultivation alternative about one 
income of SEK 37,500 per hectare. You may also prefer a cultivation alternative such as entails a 50% 
chance of getting an income of SEK 52,500 and a 50% chance of getting an income SEK 3,000 per 
hectare or one of the other choices. 
In the test, we offer you 9 different cultivation alternatives. For each cultivation choice, there are two 
incomes possible (a low income or high income) with identical probabilities (50/50). You should now 
choose your favorite among the 9 cultivation options and to mark that box. You have to choose an 
option to proceed. Income includes only sales value and not your costs for growing potatoes. 
 
1. Mark your preferred income distribution opportunities 
Cultivation options 1  Income Chance 
High  37 500  50% 
Low  37 500  50% 
Cultivation option 2  Income Chance 
High  45 000  50% 
Low  33 750  50% 
Cultivation option 3 Income Chance 
High  52 500  50% 
Low  30 000  50% 
 Cultivation option 4 Income Chance 
High  58 750  50% 
Low  26 250  50% 
 Cultivation option 5  Income Chance 
High  65 000  50% 
Low  22 500  50% 
 Cultivation option 6  Income Chance 
High  71 250  50% 
Low  18 750  50% 
Cultivation option 7  Income Chance 
High  73 750  50% 
Low  16 875  50% 
 Cultivation Option 8  Income Chance 
High  75 000  50% 
Low  15 000  50% 
Cultivation option 9  Income Chance 
High  78 750  50% 
Low  7 500  50% 
 
In the test, we offer you 9 different cultivation options. For each cultivation choice, there are two 
incomes possible (a low income or high income) with identical probabilities (50/50). You should now 
choose your favorite among the 9 cultivation options and to mark that box. You have to choose an 
option to proceed. Income includes only sales value and not your costs for growing potatoes. 
 2. Mark your preferred income distribution opportunities 
Cultivation options 1  Income Chance 
High  48 000  50% 
Low  48 000  50% 
Cultivation option 2  Income Chance 
High  57 600  50% 
Low  43 200  50% 
 Cultivation option 3  Income Chance 
High  67 200  50% 
Low  38 400  50% 
 Cultivation option 4  Income Chance 
High  75 200  50% 
Low  33 600  50% 
 Cultivation option 5  Income Chance 
High  83 200  50% 
Low  28 800  50% 
 Cultivation option 6 Income Chance 
High  91 200  50% 
Low  24 000  50% 
Cultivation option 7  Income Chance 
High  94 400  50% 
Low  21 600  50% 
 Cultivation Option 8  Income Chance 
High  96 000  50% 
Low  19 200  50% 
 Cultivation option 9  Income Chance 
High   100 800 50% 
Low  9 600  50% 
 
In the test, we offer you 9 different cultivation options. For each cultivation choice, there are two 
incomes possible (a low income or high income) with identical probabilities (50/50). You should now 
choose your favorite among the 9 cultivation options and to mark that box. You have to choose an 
option to proceed. Income includes only sales value and not your costs for growing potatoes. 
3. Mark your preferred income distribution opportunities 
Cultivation options 1  Income Chance 
High  57 000  50% 
Low  57 000  50% 
Cultivation option 2  Income Chance 
High  68 400  50% 
Low  51 300  50% 
 Cultivation option 3  Income Chance 
High  79 800  50% 
Low  45 600  50% 
 Cultivation option 4  Income Chance 
High  89 300  50% 
Low  39 900  50% 
 Cultivation option 5  Income Chance 
High  98 800  50% 
 Low  34 200  50% 
 Cultivation option 6  Income Chance 
High  108 300 50% 
Low  28 500  50% 
Cultivation option 7  Income Chance 
High  112 100 50% 
Low  25 650  50% 
 Cultivation Option 8  Income Chance 
High  114,000 50% 
Low  22 800  50% 
 Cultivation option 9  Income Chance 
High  119 700 50% 
Low  11 400  50% 
 
In the test, we offer you 9 different cultivation options. For each cultivation choice, there are two 
incomes possible (a low income or high income) with identical probabilities (50/50). You should now 
choose your favorite among the 9 cultivation options and to mark that box. You have to choose an 
option to proceed. Income includes only sales value and not your costs for growing potatoes. 
4. Mark your preferred income distribution opportunities. 
Cultivation options 1  Income Chance 
High  66 000  50% 
Low  66 000  50% 
Cultivation option 2  Income Chance 
High  79 200  50% 
Low  59 400  50% 
 Cultivation option 3  Income Chance 
High  92 400  50% 
Low  52 800  50% 
 Cultivation option 4  Income Chance 
High  103 400 50% 
Low  46 200  50% 
 Cultivation option 5  Income Chance 
High  114 400 50% 
Low  39 600  50% 
 Cultivation option 6  Income Chance 
High  125 400 50% 
Low  33 000  50% 
Cultivation option 7  Income Chance 
High  129 800 50% 
Low  29 700  50% 
 Cultivation Option 8  Income Chance 
High  132 000 50% 
Low  26 400  50% 
 Cultivation option 9  Income Chance 
High  138 600 50% 
Low  13 200  50% 
 
 In the test, we offer you 9 different cultivation options. For each cultivation choice, there are two 
incomes possible (a low income or high income) with identical probabilities (50/50). You should now 
choose your favorite among the 9 cultivation options and to mark that box. You have to choose an 
option to proceed. Income includes only sales value and not your costs for growing potatoes. 
5. Mark your preferred income distribution opportunities. 
Cultivation options 1  Income Chance 
High  75 000  50% 
Low  75 000  50% 
Cultivation option 2  Income Chance 
High  9 000  50% 
Low  67 500  50% 
 Cultivation option 3  Income Chance 
High  105 000 50% 
Low  6 000  50% 
 Cultivation option 4 Income Chance 
High  117 500 50% 
Low  52 500  50% 
 Cultivation option 5  Income Chance 
High  130 000 50% 
Low  45 000  50% 
 Cultivation option 6  Income Chance 
High  142 500 50% 
Low  37 500  50% 
Cultivation option 7  Income Chance 
High  147 500 50% 
Low  33 750  50% 
 Cultivation Option 8  Income Chance 
High  150 000 50% 
Low  30 000  50% 
 Cultivation option 9  Income Chance 
High  157 500 50% 
Low  15 000  50% 
 
The income of your company may be different from year to year. Here are several measures that can 
be used to affect the oscillations. The measures are certainly perceived to be of different importance 
different people depending on how the individual situation looks. We ask that you now mark on the 
seven-point scale how important you think the following measures are, for your company to achieve 
such a stable result (net profit before tax) as possible. 
In your answers, we ask you to consider how important these measures are or could be just you. 
 
1. Paying bills on time 
2. Not using a checking account or other short-term credit options to their full extent 
3. Having a balanced crop rotation 
4. Maintaining a low debt-equity ratio 
5. Having full insurance 
6. Diversifying farm activities 
7. Participating in machinery collaboration or contract machinery 
8. Purchasing inputs in good time 
 9. Regularly testing machineries such as sprayer and seed drill 
10. Practicing minimum tillage 
11. Continually discussing the business with professional advisors 
12. Searching for information before making decisions 
13. Having thorough, documented monitoring of production 
14. Producing the highest quality, even if this implies eg having to work more 
15. Following regulations (eg for environmental subsidies) 
16. Having employees 
17. Having newer and well-maintained machinery 
18. Having access to temporary help if needed 
19. Having access to crop drying and storage facilities (either own facilities or through collaboration 
with other farmers) 
20. Selling on contract 
21. Participating in study circles and courses that are relevant for the business  
22. Having good contact with neighbors 
23. Having time to participate in social activities 
24. Thinking progressively and searching for possibilities to develop the business 
25. Getting family to share thoughts about the business and getting them to support the work 
 
 
People often see risks in situations where the outcome or consequences are not known, as in situations 
where the outcome can be negative. However, the attitude to uncertainty is personal and we are 
interested in your "gut feeling" for the extent to which the following aspects create instability and 
uncertainty about the performance of your farm. Mark your answer to the seven-point scale. In your 
responses, we ask you to determine the extent to which these aspects create instability and uncertainty 
for the result for your company. 
 
1. Not paying bills on time  
2. Using a checking account or other short-term credit options to their full extent 
3. Not working with a balanced crop rotation  
4. Not maintaining a low debt-equity ratio  
5. Not having full insurance  
6. Not diversifying farm activities  
7. Not participating in machinery collaboration or contract machinery 
8. Not purchasing inputs in good time  
9. Not regularly testing machineries such as sprayer and seed drill 
10. Not practicing minimum tillage  
11. Not continually discussing the business with professional advisors 
12. Not searching for information before making decisions  
13. Not having thorough, documented monitoring of production 
14. Not producing the highest quality, if this implies eg having to work more 
15. Not following regulations (eg for environmental subsidies) 
16. Not having employees  
17. Not having newer and well-maintained machinery  
18. Not having access to temporary help, if needed  
19. Not having access to crop drying and storage facilities (either own facilities or through 
collaboration with other farmers) 
20. Not selling on contract  
 21. Not participating in study circles and courses that are relevant for the business 
22. Not having good contact with neighbors  
23. Not having time to participate in social activities  
24. Not thinking progressively and searching for possibilities to develop the business 
25. Not getting the family to share thoughts about the business and getting them to support the 
work 
 
1. How many years have you grown potatoes? 
2. What is your target for sales value for potato cultivation? (only revenue in removed the 
costs nine hectares for the cultivation of potatoes) crowns per hectare 
3. How likely you are to achieve this income measure  
4. Is this income target pronounced as something you are trying to achieve 
5. Is this income target higher than just covering the costs of cultivation? 
6. Approximately how much of the household's total income depends on potato cultivation? 
7. Gender 
8. Age 
9. In which county do you run your agriculture 
10. What best describes your education background 
Elementary school 
Upper secondary school 
Post-secondary education not agrarian 
Post-secondary education agrarian 
 
 
Thank you for allocating your time to participate in this study. It will be a great help to analyze how 
income uncertainty affects potato growers. Do you want to if you have a small summary of the study 
in Swedish, can you register your e-mail below. This will be sent out when the study is 
published. Again, thank you very much for your participation. 
Daniel Pettersson 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Thank you for your participation 
 
 
 
 
 
